

Promoting self-governance without local ownership

A case study of the Security Sector Reform in Liberia

Karianne Quist Stig



Master thesis, Institute for Political Science

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

The 11th of February 2009

Words: 36441

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to thank my informants in Monrovia, Ganta, and Saniquillie, who made this study possible. I am grateful for your interest in being a part of this study and letting your voice be heard. Also, special thanks go to my two contact persons in Liberia, Sam and James Ngenda, who helped me get the right connections, and to my supervisor Morten Bøås and the research institutions Fafo and Nordic Africa Institute. Thanks also to Mats Utas, for the discussion of the interview material.

The field study in Liberia was both exciting and challenging at the same time. I want to thank Susan Parker and her family for their kindness and support during my stay in Monrovia. Furthermore I want to thank Thomas Berntsen and Stine Grøndahl for all their help in the finishing stage of writing this thesis.

List of contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	III
MAP OF LIBERIA.....	IX
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	X
1.0 PEACEBUILDING IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY	1
1.1 DEMARCATION AND OPERATIONALISATION	3
1.1.1 <i>Understanding post-conflict Liberia</i>	4
1.1.2 <i>Local ownership and democratic governance</i>	5
1.1.3 <i>Peace- and statebuilding</i>	7
1.1.4 <i>Security sector reform</i>	8
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	8
1.3 RESEARCH DESIGN	9
1.3.1 <i>A case study</i>	10
1.3.2 <i>Criteria of validity and reliability</i>	11
1.4 INTRODUCTION TO THE FIELD.....	13
1.4.1 <i>Acquiring the contacts</i>	14
1.4.2 <i>Observation</i>	15
1.4.3 <i>Sources of information</i>	15
1.4.4 <i>Interviews</i>	16
1.4.5 <i>Tape recorder and notes</i>	18
1.4.6 <i>Language</i>	19
1.5 SECONDARY SOURCES	19
1.6 DATA ANALYSIS	21
1.7 RESEARCH ETHICS.....	21
1.8 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT PHASES	22
1.9 OUTLINE	23
2.0 THEORETICAL APPROACH AND LITERATURE REVIEW.....	24
2.1 STATEBUILDING IN A POST-CONFLICT CONTEXT	24
2.2 THE AGENDA OF INTERVENTION.....	25
2.2.1 <i>Legitimising interventions, redefining sovereignty</i>	26
2.3 FAVOURING GOVERNANCE OVER GOVERNMENT	28
2.3.1 <i>Governance as peace</i>	30
2.4 VIRTUAL TRUSTEESHIP	30
2.4.1 <i>A multiplicity of actors</i>	32

2.4.2 Duration and exit	33
2.5 A QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP	34
2.5.1 Capacity building	36
2.6 SUMMARY	37
3.0 A STRUGGLE FOR STATE POWER	39
3.1 DIFFERENT WAYS OF ANALYSING THE WAR	39
3.2 A HISTORY OF STATE EXCLUSION	40
3.2.1 The destruction of the state	42
3.2.2 The complete breakdown: 1989-2003	43
3.3 THE CPA	45
3.3.1 The legal reference for the SSR	46
3.4 SUMMARY	47
4.0 GOVERNANCE OF THE SSR	48
4.1 AN UNEVEN PARTNERSHIP OF GOVERNANCE	48
4.2 THE LNP	51
4.2.1 The LNP as a symbol of the state	52
4.3 THE AFL	53
4.4 OWNERSHIP NOT TAKEN	57
4.4.1 A lack of local capacity	58
4.4.2 A technical approach	60
4.5 SUMMARY	66
5.0 AN EXPERIENCE OF INSECURITY AND ALIENATION	67
5.1 A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MONROVIA AND NIMBA COUNTY	67
5.1.1 Enhanced crime rates and the LNP	68
5.1.2 Mob violence	69
5.2 LAND DISPUTES AS RE-ENFORCING ETHNIC AND TRIBAL TENSIONS	70
5.2.1 A local and a national dimension	74
5.2.2 A problem of reintegration	74
5.2.3 A regional dimension	76
5.3 A FEELING OF ALIENATION	77
5.3.1 Embracing the concept of local ownership	78
5.3.2 A divided people	80
5.3.3 A peace of external governance	81
5.4 SUMMARY	82
6.0 FROM THE COMMUNITIES TO THE AFL AND THE LNP	84
6.1 NO CHANGE IN THE LNP	84
6.2 ETHNICITY AND RIVALRY IN THE NEW AFL	86
6.3 THE STATE-CENTRIC APPROACH AND THE LOCAL CONTEXT	87

6.3.1 <i>The policy actors and policy-making</i>	88
6.3.2 <i>Between an external and a local security architecture</i>	90
6.4 SUMMARY	92
7.0 SUMMING UP AND FINAL REMARKS	93
7.1 A DEPOLITICISED APPROACH, AN EXPERIENCE OF ALIENATION	94
7.2 SECURITY CHALLENGES.....	95
7.3 NO REAL CHANGE	96
7.4 THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED	97
7.5 A TECHNICAL APPROACH IS NOT SUFFICIENT	98
REFERENCES	100
APPENDIX, AN OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWS	111

Map of Liberia



Map no. 3775 Rev. 6 United Nations, January 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section

Acronyms and abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
APD	Alliance for Peace and Democracy
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR(R)	Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (and Rehabilitation)
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
GoL	Government of Liberia
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LNP	Liberian National Police
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NESH	Norwegian Ethical Research Committee for Social Science and Humanities
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
PMC	Private Military Company
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSS	Special Security Services
TWP	True Whig Party
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	United Nations Mission In Liberia
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States

1.0 Peacebuilding in a post-conflict society

In post-conflict societies, it is not evident who the national actors are, or whether it is really possible to talk about national ownership in the aftermath of civil war. Yet, international actors are involved in peacebuilding operations specifying the relevant national actors, deciding who are relevant and who are not (Paris and Sisk 2007:4). This is problematic in a post-conflict situation like the one in Liberia, since society is likely to be highly polarised. It grows even more problematic when international actors are assuming governing functions, making the political spheres of external and internal governance unclear (Chandler 2006:22). In contemporary peacebuilding operations the democratic aspects of reform seem to have become subordinated the external governance of it (Chandler 2006:22). This seems also to be the case in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Liberia, where there is a lack of local ownership in the reform process (Ebo 2005 and 2007, Loden 2007). Following Chandler's (2006:22) argument, the responsibility that follows with intervention is being neglected. The result is statebuilding operations that follow technical rather than political measures, thus making these rebuilt states resemble 'choiceless' democracies (Mkandawire 1999:123). It not only enhances the degree of intrusiveness caused by a peacebuilding operation, but it also prolongs the dependency on external assistance, especially if the external governance comes to be perceived as what secures the peace (Richmond 2004:97).

Through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) from 2003, the United Nations (UN) was called upon to facilitate a consolidated UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The mission was supposed to be a light footprint mission, since the external actors had been called upon to exercise a degree of administration, without being explicitly authorised to do so (Chesterman 2004:22). However, as previous research on the SSR in Liberia has shown, there is a lack of local ownership in the reform process (see Ebo 2005, 2007 and Loden 2007), indicating that the degree of intrusiveness is quite high. The SSR is moving forward with full steam, but the focus is on external

efficiency, with a minimal degree of parliamentary, and civilian, oversight and inclusion in the process (Ebo 2005, 2007 and Loden 2007). The SSR has primarily focused on the reconstruction of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). The United Nations Police (UNPOL) is reconstructing the LNP, while DynCorp, a Private Military Company (PMC) hired by the United States (US), is reconstructing the AFL.

Drawing upon previous research on the SSR in Liberia, this study seeks to deepen the field by questioning whether the lack of local ownership in the SSR is undermining the reform as a peacebuilding activity. In contrast to previous research on the SSR (see Ebo 2005 and 2007, Jaye 2006, ICG 2009, Loden 2007) the focus is not primarily on the technical benchmarks and the lack of participation by the legislature and civil society. Instead, it is primary attached to the local context in which the peacebuilding operations is taking place, and on how the question of ownership is experienced in this context. This is approached by studying the conditions that led to the civil war; whether these conditions still exists in the Liberian society and how it affects the question of ownership and prospect of self-governance. It is an empirical grounded approach that focuses on the micro level, instead of the macro level as previous research on the SSR has done. As Bøås (2009a) argues, the international community has made plans for Liberia, without considering how the situation is on the ground. This makes it highly significant to question the consequences of the lack of local ownership in the SSR, especially since the full withdrawal of UNMIL is supposed to commence in 2010, and the completion of the reform is seen as facilitating an exit strategy. The main research question is therefore:

Is the lack of local ownership in the SSR undermining the SSR as a peacebuilding activity in Liberia?

The research question is grounded in the debate concerning statebuilding as a peacebuilding activity, and seeks to examine whether, and how the lack of local ownership is affecting the SSR as a peacebuilding activity. By questioning the SSR as a peacebuilding activity, the broader framework of the statebuilding operation in Liberia is also questioned. As Bryden and Hänggi (2004:185) argue, SSR in a post-conflict setting is a part of the development of an effective and overarching governance framework.

1.1 Demarcation and operationalisation

In addition to the LNP and the AFL the SSR has focused on reconstructing the Special Security Services (SSS). The SSS is the security services protecting the government. The SSS will be mentioned throughout the study, but the primary focus is on the reform of the LNP and the AFL. As mentioned in the introduction the essay builds on previous research on the lack of local ownership in the SSR in Liberia (Ebo 2005, 2007 and Loden 2007). To analyse local ownership and the effects of it, Nathan's (2007:7) two imperatives of local ownership are employed. Firstly, the reform should secure that it reflects the local needs and dynamics in society; and secondly, it should enhance the chances of consolidating peace and democracy (Nathan 2007:7). The imperatives will be used as premises for analysing whether the approach to the SSR is undermining the reform as a peacebuilding activity. The following two supplementary questions are used to operationalise the overall research question and the two imperatives of local ownership.

To what degree is the external approach to the SSR in Liberia in line with the security situation, as experienced by the communities?

Is the external governance of the SSR in Liberia alienating the local community through the implementation of the reform?

The experience of the security situation in the communities and the feeling of alienation are connected to the concept of local ownership. The feeling of alienation concerns the degree of transparency and accountability in the SSR and the degree of participation by local actors. The underlying assumption for this study is not that local actors necessarily would develop good practices, but rather that local actors need to be empowered and respected to yield good results in the long-term (Nathan 2007:7-8). Because of the political aspects of peacebuilding, it is a paradox if the statebuilding operation primarily focuses on the product of what the operation seeks to achieve, instead of focusing on the process. By not focusing on the process, the peace risks becoming a virtual peace where external governance is perceived as what secures it (Richmond 2004:97). What is missing is, as Chandler (2008:23-24) argues, a focus on the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship, in which the political community is developing. As will be elaborated in the background chapter and in the chapters of analysis, the history of Liberia is a history of state exclusion. Ethnic groups have been excluded in both political and social life (Bøås 2005, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, Ellis 1999, Huband 1998, Sawyer 2005, Utas 2003). This makes the question of alienation extremely important in the context of Liberia.

1.1.1 Understanding post-conflict Liberia

To understand the context in which the peacebuilding operation in Liberia is taking place, it is necessary to comprehend the underlying dimensions, which led to the civil war in 1989. The Liberian civil war is not an example of a new war. Rather, the root causes for the civil war is deeply rooted in the history of Liberia (Bøås 2009b). This study has mainly followed Bøås' (2005, 2009b and 2009c) perspective on the civil war. Bøås (2009c) shows how identity was an important underlying dimension for

the war. The identity dimension concerns the issue of land, and to whom it belongs. It represents a firstcomer-latecomer conflict.

In Ganta and Saniquillie in Nimba County, where I conducted fieldwork, the majority of the inhabitants are either belonging to the Mano or Gio ethnic groups, while the Mandingos are the minority. The Mandingo population is by many Liberians regarded as outsiders who do not really belong in Liberia (Ellis 1999:39). This is also the case in Nimba County. The resentment against the Mandingos increased during the war, since they were first associated with the presidency of Samuel Doe, and later with Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), who fought against Charles Taylor's Government of Liberia (GoL). Taylor's forces were mainly composed of people from the Mano and Gio groups. After the war ended, the Mandingos have been the last group to return to Ganta. The absence of the Mandingos have made it possible for the Gio and Mano to take back the land they believe is originally theirs, and to take control of the trade that was the Mandingos domain prior to the war (Bøås 2009c). Ethnicity is not a dimension in itself, but it is a component of the identity dimension. It has been socially constructed as a result of the administrative boundaries laid by the True Whig Party (TWP), who governed the state exclusively for the first 110 years after its foundation (Bøås 2005:77, Ellis 1999:43). Identity concerns how one regard oneself, and is connected to the question of belonging to the land. However, by socially constructing ethnicity, identity has to a large degree been transformed to collective identity, thus promoting the ethnic cleavages in the society.

1.1.2 Local ownership and democratic governance

Ownership in a reform process concerns who designs, manages and implements the reform. To have local ownership in a statebuilding operation means that the local actors are the designers, managers and implementers of the reform, while the external

actors are the supporters of it (Nathan 2007:7, UN 2007:8). This study operates with degrees of ownership, meaning that different degrees of ownership can exist and it is therefore not simply a question of having full local ownership or not. The choice of using the concept of local ownership instead of national ownership is based on the recognition that it is of little relevance to speak of national owners in the context of Liberia. National polarisation was an important dimension of the civil war, - a war that started in the hinterland - and it is still an important dimension of Liberian society (Bøås 2009b). Local ownership in a context like the one in Liberia has to include different layers of society, and thereby also address the communities in the hinterland.

Today, Liberia has the most legitimate democratic government in its history, but as a democratic project the SSR should also ensure that local ownership is broadened to include parliament, civil society and the people, and not confined to the government and the external actors (Nathan 2007:9). The SSR should be governed by the principles of democratic governance. According to Ebo (2005:2), democratic governance with regard to the SSR can be defined as:

Institutionally, democratic governance of the security sector would necessarily include a constitutional and legal framework, civilian control and management of the security sector, parliamentary control and oversight, judicial control, and broader public control that extends to the civil society and informed debate on national security issues.

Following this definition then, democratic governance means governing by the principles of transparency, accountability and participation to the parliament, civil society and the people.

1.1.3 Peace- and statebuilding

Peacebuilding presupposes an end to conflict, and can be termed a post-conflict enterprise, where the aim of the operation is to secure a stable and lasting peace (Paris 2004:38-39). Securing a stable and lasting peace goes beyond an attempt to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. Thus, as Barnett and Zuercher (2008:5) argues: [...] *it involves an effort to eliminate the root causes of conflict, to promote the security of the individual, societal groups, and the state, and to nurture features that create the conditions for a stable peace.* The quotation corresponds with how former UN secretary general Boutros-Ghali (1992) defined the concept of peacebuilding. Boutros-Ghali (1992) introduced the concept of UN peacebuilding in a new context of human security. It is a wide concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources and environmental security. Thus implying that the concept of peace has changed. According to Galtung's (1969:183) definition of peace, it resembles a change from negative peace to positive peace. Negative peace simply denotes the absence of war, representing a condition where no active organised military violence is taking place. Positive peace on the other hand, means the absence of war and interstate violence and includes a condition of positive and life enhancing values and social structures (Galtung 1969:184).

A central element in the new strategy to achieve a positive peace is the development of a particular kind of state, a liberal democracy (Barnett and Zuercher 2008:9). In most post-conflict societies developing such a state includes building the state. Statebuilding is here defined as building functioning and self-sustaining state structures (Narten 2008:2). At the same time, it is acknowledged that statebuilding in post-conflict societies distinguishes itself from the context in which the Western state was built. As Barnett and Zuercher (2008:8) point out, in post-conflict societies there exists a dual crisis of security and legitimacy, which needs to be addressed.

1.1.4 Security sector reform

SSR can in a narrow sense be defined as state-centric, or in a broader sense as human-centric (Bryden and Hänggi 2004:6). The human-centric approach comprises civil society groups and non-statutory forces. This is important in a country where the monopoly of the instruments of coercion has not been solely in the hands of the state and its institutions, which the state-centric definition of the concept assumes (Rees 2006:4, Sedra 2004:2). There are two core normative elements defining the concept of SSR. These are the development of security bodies capable of providing security to the state, and the people, and the development of democratic governance (Bryden and Hänggi 2004:9). The agenda of the SSR can be perceived in four main dimensions: a political, an institutional, an economical and a societal dimension (Channa 2002:28). The political dimension determines the management of the state, and promotes democratic governance. The institutional dimension concerns building capacity in the state institutions to govern the security sector, and to build the capacity in the security forces. The economical dimension is concerned with the budget and resources of the security sector. Finally the societal dimension is concerned with the role of civil society, the independent media, and the research- and advocacy institutions (Channa 2002:28-30). In the SSR in Liberia the concepts of reform and reconstruction are used as describing the same phenomenon, as it also is done throughout this study.

1.2 Significance of the study

The policy implementation of the SSR in Liberia is through its singular focus on the core security institutions following a state-centric approach. This makes it highly relevant to study its actual consequences on the security situation and thereby, how the security is experienced in society. Previous research has shown that the feeling of insecurity was the main reason for joining a rebel group during the civil war in Liberia (Bøås and Hatløy 2008:47). This makes the civilian experience of security an important issue to address in the SSR. By emphasising the civilian experience and the

local context, this study places itself in a larger discussion about how context matters. There is a need to re-examine the concept of local ownership and the security considerations, as they are experienced in the context of Liberia. As Bøås and Hatløy (2008:53) conclude in an article about the prospects for re-integration in post-war Liberia: *Re-examining security considerations can therefore help us understand these challenges, as well as illustrating the importance of basing post-conflict programmes such as DDRR¹ on knowledge derived from and specific to the local context.* Their argument is not confined to the DDR, but also relevant for the SSR and other programs of the statebuilding process as well. This study follows Bøås and Hatløy in being critical to an assumption of ‘one size fits all’ when conducting international statebuilding operations. The reform of the LNP and the AFL is in its last stages of implementation, and the UN is supposed to start its full withdrawal in 2010. This highlights the present significance of the research questions. They are highly policy relevant and contribute to the debate in Liberia and beyond.

1.3 Research design

Studying the consequences of the lack of local ownership in the SSR has required conducting a qualitative study. As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of the study is not to measure the degree of local involvement, or the number of people retrained to the LNP and AFL. The aim is rather to acquire empirical information on how the concept of ownership is understood in the local context, and how the lack of it is experienced. As Marshall and Rossman (1995:5) point out, qualitative studies must occur in natural settings and cannot be artificially constructed. The qualitative approach has clear advantages since statebuilding is a field that is theoretically underdeveloped and where the concepts are still vague (Ragin and Meur 2000:750). The study is designed through a single case study of the SSR in Liberia.

¹ DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation). Rehabilitation was included in the program, however as research done by Jennings (2007:205) has shown, rehabilitation has not really been a part of the DDRR process. This research will follow Jennings example and use the term DDR instead.

By using a single case study enabled me to draw on multiple sources in order to acquire detailed knowledge about the social context, and the local actors' perception of reality (Hellevik 1991:81). A field study with interviews has been the primary method in obtaining the required information. Secondary sources in use are: the CPA (2003), the International Crisis Group's (ICG 2009) report on SSR in Liberia, the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) progress report from 2008, and previous research conducted on the background of the civil war and why people took up arms in the first place. By using multiple sources, the validity and reliability of the research is strengthened since it provides the research with multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin 2003:99). This is what Andersen (1997:90) characterises as the great advantage of single case studies. As the analysis will show, the multitude of sources converge, enhancing the validity of the study.

1.3.1 A case study

The choice of the SSR in Liberia as a case was based on a specific interest in the particular case. The research question was chosen after a consideration of previous research conducted on the case, and how this study could be placed in the current debate on externally driven statebuilding. In regard to the specific case, there is still a lack of empirical studies on both the outcomes of the statebuilding process, and on how the security situation is experienced in the aftermath of the civil war. In regard to the theoretical debate, it has based itself primarily on research conducted on externally driven statebuilding operations of a more intrusive nature (see Caplan 2005, Chandler 2002 and 2006, Chesterman 2004, Narten 2008). This study is a contribution to this debate by using a case where the intrusiveness of the international engagement officially was supposed to resemble a light footprint model. However, as will be discussed in the analysis (see chapters four, five and six), the level of intrusiveness seems to be quite high.

It implies that the single case is one among many cases connected to the phenomenon, and corresponds with Walton's (1992:121) argument that a case implies a family: [...] *it alleges that the particular is a case of something else*. The case of the SSR in Liberia is an example of the phenomenon statebuilding, which together with democratisation are the two primary aims and means in UN-led peacebuilding operations (Barnett and Zuercher 2008:9). The theoretical discussion of peace- and statebuilding is an important aspect, since the possibility of acquiring general knowledge about these phenomena depends on whether the case can also be placed in the broader theoretical debate (Andersen 1997:93). However, although the theory has worked as a tool, the study is still an empirical inquiry based primarily on information received in the concrete context.

1.3.2 Criteria of validity and reliability

As a prerequisite to ensure the validity of the study, it has been important to conduct a study free of random errors, thus securing its reliability (Hoyle et al. 2002:83). Seeking validity in the process of gathering information means striving to acquire information that resembles the reality of the conditions being studied. This study acknowledges that reality exists as ideas and experiences, as much as it exists as material and social reality. It is this diversity of different realities the study has sought to obtain knowledge of. The informants' experiences of security and insecurity, and of inclusion and exclusion, have been vital for this study since they are directly linked to the research questions asked. This definition of reality and the operationalisation of the research question place this study within an interpretative constructionist research philosophy (Rubin and Rubin 2005:27-30). As Rubin and Rubin (2005:28) outline: *Constructionist researchers try to elicit the interviewee's views of their worlds, their work, and the events they have experienced or observed*.

To evaluate the validity of the study, I am using the three criteria of construct-,

internal- and external validity, as put forth by Hoyle et al. (2002:31-32) and Yin (2003:33-39). Construct validity aims to secure that the process of operationalisation also reflects the concepts, which the study is seeking to analyse. In this process it has been necessary to consider the choice of concepts. The choice of using local ownership instead of national ownership was due to an expectation that it would not be possible to talk about national actors in the context of Liberia, because of the historical fragmented nature of its society. This choice was based on research conducted on the history of the country, and on the causes and dynamics of the war. In accordance with Adcock and Collier's (2001:532) argument on how to choose the right concept, the study has justified its choices by using concepts that are linked to the aim of the study, and to the context in which the research is taking place. By asking questions in the interviews concerning both local and national actors, I was able to test the validity of the concept in use. Both the concept of local and national ownership can be operationalised, but the latter could have resulted in random errors, thus decreasing the reliability of the findings. The main criticism against case studies as a research strategy concerns the question of securing sufficiently operational measures, and the possibility, that subjective judgments may affect the process of gathering information, and the following interpretation of them (Yin 2003:35). Testing the main concept in use, using multiple sources, and evaluating the empirical findings, have been tactics to overcome this challenge and ensure the concepts in use are operational and free from random errors. This strategy corresponds with the case study tactics as they are suggested by Yin (2003:34).

The research questions indicate that there is a causal relationship between local ownership and success in the SSR. Internal validity is the extent to which conclusions of correlation between the two variables can be drawn. However, finding a correlation between the two variables has not been enough to secure the internal validity, because the variables can correlate, even in the absent of a causal relationship (Yin 2003:36). The theoretical framework, and previous research conducted in Liberia have been tools when analysing the relationship between the

two variables, securing the study's internal validity. External validity concerns whether the study is representative, so that the findings can be generalised to the population as a whole (Hoyle et al. 2002:41). In this study it would not have been practical or sufficient to draw on a random sample of informants. Instead, key informants have been used to get in-depth empirical knowledge, thus obtaining the relevant information. This corresponds with how the constructionist approach is a guide to both observational and in-depth interviewing, and has affected the choice of using responsive interviews as a research method (Rubin and Rubin 2005:20). To enhance the external validity, generalisation is done on a theoretical basis instead. Even though statistical analysis is not possible in qualitative studies, questions of internal and external validity are nevertheless important considerations in qualitative studies.

1.4 Introduction to the field

The field study was primarily conducted in the capital Monrovia, and in Ganta, and Saniquillie, in Nimba County. The capital is the main area of operation for UNMIL, which is why I chose to focus on Monrovia. Nimba County, as the second area of focus during the field study, is also of great relevance. It was in Nimba County the war started in 1989, and it is one of the counties where the largest battles were fought during the war (Ellis 1999:75). Nimba County is also relevant because it borders with both Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. As it will be elaborated in chapter three and five the war had a regional dimension, and the contemporary security situation still requires a regional aspect in the security architecture. According to my informants, Nimba County was also recognised as one of the three counties with the greatest security challenges. The other two are Lofa and Grand Bassa County.

During the field study, the research also led me to Gbarnga in Bong County and to a market area in Guinea. In Guinea I was present during an interview conducted by the

Danish PhD. student Jairo Munive. The interview was with one of the chiefs from the Mandingo population in Ganta. In Gbarnga I followed the recruitment team from DynCorp on a recruitment day. The AFL has not only been reconstructed, but also reconstituted. To secure that the new AFL will be representative for the whole country, DynCorp's recruitment team has gone on recruitment tours to the various counties in the country.

1.4.1 Acquiring the contacts

Getting the right contacts was not a problem during the field study, even though it had been difficult to get appointments ready prior to entering the field. The internet-connection in Liberia is generally unstable and most of the contacts I had prior to the field study preferred that I called them after my arrival in Monrovia. During the first couple of days in the capital I got a good overview as to whom I should contact, and I quickly got the right interview appointments. Being a young female researcher had its clear advantage when studying the security sector, which is male dominated. My youthful appearance, and my gender, seemed to make some of the informants talk more openly about highly sensitive issues since they did not regard me as a threat. At the same time, it also made me extra cautious about how to approach the interview situation. It made me consider whether the informants had been exaggerating in some of their statements, as an attempt to impress me with their knowledge on the subject. I have considered this in the interpretation of the interviews, and to enhance the reliability of the findings I have discussed the interview material with my supervisor Morten Bøås, as well as Mats Utas and Jairo Munive. All of them have conducted extensive fieldwork in Liberia. The discussions have been used to control the validity of the findings and thereby also enhance the legitimacy and reliability of them.

1.4.2 Observation

The aim of the field study was to gather material through interviews, but observation was also a central element during the field study. Observations made during the field study were continuously included in the interviews to acquire a deeper knowledge on the phenomenon, and as a way of enhancing the validity of the observed (Mikkelsen 1995:102). I was aware that the influence between observations and interviews could also go the other way around - that the findings from the interviews could affect how incidents were interpreted. Observations in the field were based on an attempt to understand the culture from within, but at the same time I was aware of my role as a researcher, and an outsider. As Thagaard (2006:75) points out, this enables a researcher to connect, not only with the culture that is necessary to understand it, but also benefit from the advantage of being an outsider.

1.4.3 Sources of information

The primary sources interviewed during the field study were, government representatives, community actors and representatives from UNPOL and DynCorp. The community actors were civil society groups, community leaders, and former rebel commanders who presently work with the re-integration of ex-combatants, still enjoying great influence on the youth who once fought. In the communities - especially in the hinterland - community leaders are important to the societal structure. Priests, chiefs and former commanders have a significant role in the societies. These actors are particularly important informants to understand the dynamics in the communities.

During the field study I focused on gathering information on how the reform of the security sector was experienced; which problems that had occurred in the process of reform; and which security challenges that still may exist. The use of informants from DynCorp, and the opportunity to go with them on a recruitment day, enabled me to

obtain more knowledge about the military reform. This was of great value since the reform of the AFL to a large extent proceeds as a closed process because of DynCorp's role as a private contractor (Ebo 2005:24). Interviews with police officers from UNPOL and from the retrained LNP enabled me to gather information on how far the reconstruction process of the LNP has come, and what kind of problems they have had and are still experiencing in the process. The use of different community actors and civil society groups as informants has given the study a broader perspective on how the process is experienced in the local context, and what the major challenges are.

One methodological concern in regard to the informants is that most of the informants from Nimba County were from the Mano and Gio ethnic groups. It may be the result of having a contact person, who is an ethnic Mano. In addition, many Mandingos have not yet returned to the county. This is a consideration I have recognised by using secondary sources as reports on the challenges of land disputes and ethnicity, and through my discussions with Morten Bøås, Jairo Munive and Mats Utas. During the field study in Ganta I also had an interview with Nyahn Flomo who works for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The NRC in Liberia works with the issue of land disputes, and together with the Danish Refugee Council they are trying to negotiate between the parties. Although the methodological problem concerning the ethnicity of the informants in Nimba has been recognised, by using secondary sources, I still acknowledge that the problem does not entirely disappear.

1.4.4 Interviews

The purpose of the qualitative research interviews were to obtain knowledge of how the informants experience the security situation in their community, and the security institutions that are being reconstructed to operate there in. The interviews conducted were semi-structured interviews. They had a degree of structure, but at the same time

they had the advantage of openness that coincides with how Kvale (2006:21) defines the qualitative research interview. When conducting an interview I did not use a list of fully developed questions. Instead I used a checklist that indicated the themes I wanted to get answers on. Openness in the interview situations has been important, both to secure a rich case material and to make it more difficult for the informants to hide behind what Utas (2003:22) calls, *schematic identities of victimhood*. In a post-conflict setting as the Liberian, it is important to consider the possibility that the informants, through their answers, are presenting themselves as victims (Utas 2003:22).

When conducting a semi-structured interview, no standard methods exist. This made it possible to approach the interviews differently according to the person who was being interviewed, and how best to build the trust in each conversation (Kvale 2006:44). The interviews took form as what Rubin and Rubin (2005:108) call a responsive conversation. Compared to ordinary conversations, responsive conversations are more focused, in-depth and detailed. During the field study, I continued to be aware of my role as a researcher and of what kind of information I was seeking. At the same time, I kept an open mind to the fact that the findings could point in another direction. Even though the interviews did not follow a clear structure, they took form as a guided process. The interviews went through different stages where the interviewee was encouraged to answer in-depth and at length (Rubin and Rubin 2005:110). The main questions asked through the interviews were balanced, so as to not become leading. To further strengthen the validity of the findings, control- and follow up questions were used. This was a tool to acquire more in-depth answers. Some of the control questions were of leading character, as a way to check for the reliability of the answers. As Kvale (2006:97) points out, leading questions can be a way of strengthening the reliability instead of weakening it. Questions of clarification were also used during the interviews to make sure that what the informants had said, and how I interpreted it, coincided.

1.4.5 Tape recorder and notes

During the interviews I used a tape recorder as a tool to enhance the accuracy of the information I received. By using a tape recorder I was able to capture how the interviewees expressed themselves in terms of their choice of words and their intonation. It also made it easier to transcribe the interviews as reliably as possible, which again have made it easier to use the interviews in the analysis. One problem related to using a tape recorder, is the problem of de-contextualisation (Kvale 2006:101, Thagaard 2006:96). This problem was considered during the field study. After an interview was conducted, I wrote down a contextualisation of the interview, my first impression of it, and how I interpreted the main findings during the interview. By comparing the notes with the tape recordings, both the reliability and validity of the findings and the study have been strengthened. Transcribing interviews, and the contextualisation of them, have worked as a tool for the further analysis. It is as Kvale (2006:114) points out: *a tool for the interpretation of the things that were said in the interviews.*

During the field study, an ethical consideration arose concerning the use of a tape recorder. The interviews with the informants from DynCorp were conducted without the use of a recorder in accordance with their wishes. This may have diminished the reliability of these interviews. At the same time, not using a tape recorder can positively have affected how the representatives from DynCorp expressed themselves, when talking about sensitive issues, thus making the interviews more in-depth than they otherwise would have been. The interviews with the informants from DynCorp took form as both formal and informal interviews. In both cases they were informed of the aim of the study, and gave their consent to the purpose of the interviews. Their consent to the interviews was followed by some reservations. This was due to the sensitivity of some of the issues and how they, as representatives from a PMC, have restrictions from their employer. Because of the ethical requirement of consent, and to 'do no harm' (Kvale 2006:69 and Thagaard 2006:23-26), the

information that was given with reservations is not used directly in the presentation of the findings. Instead, it is used as a tool to give the study a wider perspective on the situation. This is in line with the ethical requirements stated by the Norwegian Ethical Research Committee for Social Science and Humanities (NESH 2006:13-14).

1.4.6 Language

The official language in Liberia is English, so no interpreter was needed. Still, the form of Liberian English can be difficult to comprehend when people speak fast, especially those from the hinterland. This made the use of tape recorder a significant tool to enhance the reliability of the findings (Kvale 2006:101-102, Rubin and Rubin 2005:203). In Ganta and in Saniquillie I also chose to have my local contact person Sam with me during the interviews. This was not only due to a consideration of possible misunderstandings in the interview situation, but also as a way of gaining the trust of the informants. Sam is one of the founders of Radio Kergheamahn in Ganta, and is highly respected in the different layers of society. Having Sam nearby in the interview situations made the respondents talk more openly about sensitive issues; his presence gained me their trust from the very start. These positive effects were considered against possible negative effects of it. As mentioned in section 1.4.3, Sam is from the Mano population in Ganta, and this may have affected how most of the interviews conducted in Nimba County, were with informants from the Mano and Gio groups.

1.5 Secondary sources

In order to be able to analyse whether the SSR is in line with the security situation, it has been crucial to trace background factors for the outbreak of the civil war, how the war took place, and why so many people in Liberia took up arms during the war. The secondary sources used to trace the background factors for the civil war are studies

conducted by prominent researchers in the field, namely Christopher Clapham (1978), Morten Bøås (2001, 2005, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d), Morten Bøås and Anne Hatløy (2008), Stephen Ellis (1999), Mark Huband (1998), Amos Sawyer (2005) and Mats Utas (2003). When using these sources I have been aware of how the focus differentiates between the researchers. The sources differ according to what dimensions they have chosen to focus on, and thereby how they analyse the background for the civil war.

The CPA (2003), the report from the ICG (2009), and the newest progress report on Liberia from UNSC (2008) are also used as secondary sources. The CPA is the peace agreement that was reached in August 2003 by GoL, LURD and Movement for Democracy of Liberia (MODEL). These three actors represent the three largest competing factions when the war ended. The CPA (2003) is used as a tool to see who the involved actors were, what principles they agreed upon, and what mandate the CPA gave the international engagement they called upon. The report by ICG (2009) focuses on how far the SSR has come, and how the progress of the SSR differentiates between the different parts of the reform. The progress report from the UNSC (2008) identifies the achievements of UNMIL, the progress of the operation and the challenges that still remain.

When using secondary sources such as documents and studies conducted by other researchers, it has been necessary not only to be aware of the validity of the producers of the material, but also of what kind of aspects the producers have chosen to focus on, and what they have omitted (Kjelstadli 1992:178). In addition, as NESH (2006:26) points out, it is important to be accurate when referring to the sources when being used in the study. This also enhances the reliability of the study, by making it easier for the reader to check the validity of the material that has been used (NESH 2006:26). Using secondary sources has been a significant tool, to further enhance the reliability of the information obtained in the field.

1.6 Data analysis

The process of analysis has not been an isolated one, but has been apparent through the collection of information as well. Even though the interviews have been open for variations in the empirical findings, a researcher's assumptions will always be apparent through the research questions asked (Kvale 2006:138-140). The process of analysis started prior to the collection of empirical knowledge, when the subject and aims for the field study were clarified. In the course of gathering information, ideas about analysis and interpretation emerged. Since the relationship between the different stages has been considered from the very beginning of the study, it has strengthened the validity rather than weakened it. As Patton (1990:378) points out, the overlapping of gathering empirical knowledge and analysis improves the quality of both the information obtained and the analysis, as long as the researcher makes sure that the initial interpretations do not distort the collection of information. As a way of ensuring the credibility of the analysis, examples on the information that are being interpreted will be presented throughout the chapters of analysis.

1.7 Research ethics

Throughout the research process, the ethics of the research has been an important consideration, especially in regard to the informants. Prior to the field study I considered how I should ask the questions so that I not only got the needed information, but also showed sensitivity when the questions might be sensitive to the respondent. In the interview situation, I started by introducing myself, my work, and what the purpose of the interview was. This was both a way of gaining the trust of the informants and their consent. Getting consent to use the interviews means that the persons interviewed have been informed about the purpose of the interview, the main characteristics of the research, and have given their consent to it (NESH 2006:12-13). To get consent to use the information from an interview represents, together with the principles of confidentiality and 'do no harm', the three main principles that Kvale

(2006:69) and Thagaard (2006:23-26) argue have to be considered in a scientific research study. In regard to revealing the identity of the persons interviewed, I had to consider both the question of consent, and whether there would be any consequences for the informants by revealing their identity. The question of revealing the identity of the informants is a dilemma between the ethics of the study, and the reliability in the presentation of the findings (Thagaard 2006:24). I have emphasised the practice of ‘do no harm’, and the question of consent when choosing whether or not to reveal the identity of the informants. This means that some of the informants are anonymous while others are presented by name.

A moral consideration I had during the field study was how the informants would react to a European researcher conducting research in a society where most of the population see every day as a continuing struggle. It turned out that most of the informants saw the interview situation as a possibility to be heard outside Liberia, and appreciated that researchers chose to use resources on studying their situation. It made them feel important. As a result people wanted to be part of the project, and equally talked openly about their experiences.

1.8 The relationship between the different phases

The different phases of the study are interlinked. The selection of the case affected the choice of research question, which in turn guided the following phases of the study. The phases are primarily interlinked through the research questions. Both the methodological and the theoretical approach resulted from the theme of the study and the research questions asked. By acknowledging how the different phases are interlinked, it has also been recognised how the validity of one phase affects the next. This has affected how I have constantly screened the different phases for validity; from the theme of the study, through the methods used, the empirical findings and the analysis of them.

1.9 Outline

In the following chapter, the concept and practice of statebuilding will be discussed. It is a theoretical discussion of peace- and statebuilding that is linked to the case of the SSR in Liberia. In chapter three I will start by making a short outline of different perspectives on the outburst of the civil war in Liberia in 1989. The following section is a historical background for the civil war and the subsequent escalation of it. The focus is on how the history of Liberia resembles a history of state exclusion of social groups. In chapter four, the analysis begins by showing how and why there is an uneven partnership of governance in the SSR, whether the governance of the SSR is an indication of a ‘choiceless’ democracy, and why the local actors are not taking the degree of local ownership that is available to them. In chapter five, the analysis will take the discussion a step further by focusing on how the security situation and the SSR is experienced in the local communities, and how local ownership is an independent variable in this regard. The last chapter of analysis will discuss how the political and technical security challenges are already apparent in the security institutions today, directly undermining the efforts of the SSR as a peacebuilding activity.

2.0 Theoretical approach and literature review

The contemporary debate on statebuilding is mainly based on external interventions of a more intrusive nature. However, the lack of local ownership in the SSR in Liberia indicates that the level of intrusiveness caused by the international engagement is quite high, contrary to its aim of being a light footprint mission. By drawing on different positions from the contemporary debate on statebuilding, it will be shown how the case of the SSR in Liberia can be placed in this theoretical debate. As outlined in chapter one, it is a discussion between the external governance of statebuilding, and the democratic aspects of it. It will be argued that there is a lack of coherence in international approaches to peacebuilding (Chandler 2006, 2008, and Paris and Sisk 2007). The democratic aspects have become subordinated the external governance of statebuilding, leading to statebuilding missions which follow technical- rather than political measures. This makes it difficult to distinguish between the external and the internal sphere of governance, making the governance structure unclear for those who are not involved in the reform (Chandler 2006:51). This affects the degree of local ownership in a reform, and as such it is also affecting to what degree the two imperatives of local ownership are at work (Nathan 2007:9). The discussion will start by emphasising how statebuilding follows a notion of state failure, and then place statebuilding in relation to new humanitarianism and how the concept of sovereignty has changed in the international community. The following sections will discuss the consequences of external governance, how it affects the statebuilding process, why the question of ownership matters, and what kind of problems follow with it.

2.1 Statebuilding in a post-conflict context

In external peacebuilding operations there is a normative framework of liberal market democratisation and good governance (Paris 2004:19, 39). Recognising that elections do not resolve conflicts, as illustrated by events following the democratic election in

Liberia in 1997, the UN has developed a more multidimensional approach where democratisation has been coupled with statebuilding (Chesterman 2007:9). In line with the objectives of statebuilding and democratisation, the international community contends that there is a need to build the capacity of state institutions, and make sure that local ownership is not confined to the executive, but broadened to include parliament and civil society (Nathan 2007:9).

Post-conflict statebuilding is grounded in a notion that the state has collapsed or failed, and thereby needs to be rebuilt. The problem with the concept of state failure is, as Bøås and Jennings (2005:386) point out, that it assumes all states have similar structures and functions, and behave in the same manner. It assumes the existence of a prototypical state, the Western state, which has affected how a standardised approach to statebuilding has developed. This study leans on the argument of Bøås and Jennings (2005:388); it is not relevant to speak of a failed state if the state presumed never actually existed. This is the case in the Liberian context, as will be illustrated in chapter three. The dynamics underlying civil wars, like the one in Liberia, have historical roots that need to be comprehended in the process of statebuilding (Bøås 2009b). This is a problem in external statebuilding processes following a standardised design (Weiss and Hoffman 2007:60). Applying a standardised design to different kinds of post-conflict settings affects how fundamental changes enter the equation, irrespective of the dynamics that led to conflict in the first place (Doornbos 2003:58). Context matters, as emphasised throughout this study.

2.2 The agenda of intervention

The evolution of statebuilding operations should be seen in compliance with the new humanitarianism, and as such also in regards to the change in how the concept of sovereignty is contextualised. New humanitarianism is a result of the embracement of

human security and has affected how the concept of peace has changed from negative to positive peace (Barash and Webel 2002:6). What have followed are interventions legitimised by a liberal cosmopolitan agenda, where the right to intervene is claimed on behalf of others (Chandler 2002:103-105). Even though the agenda for intervention to some degree changed in the aftermath of the 11th of September 2001, and the ‘global war on terror’, there is little difference between the approach that followed and the liberal cosmopolitan approach (Chandler 2008:5,27). Both approaches represent a distancing between external administrative control and the domestic political processes. As Chandler (2008:15) argues: *...rights regimes are understood to be constituted independently of and prior to the rights subjects*. In the following sections the focus will be on how the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty has enabled this approach, and what consequences it has.

2.2.1 Legitimising interventions, redefining sovereignty

There has been a re-conceptualisation of sovereignty as control, to sovereignty as responsibility (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ICISS 2001:13). Civil wars are no longer seen as primarily an internal problem, but as our shared responsibility that shall be taken up by the international community, in accordance with the principle of collective security (UN 2004:17). It is a responsibility to protect, which includes a responsibility to react, prevent and rebuild. It is a responsibility to the citizens internally and it is a responsibility externally to the international community. Sovereignty is in the UN understood as embracing this dual responsibility (ICISS 2001:8). Still, with a responsibility to protect, sovereignty issues arise. The redefinition of sovereignty legitimises humanitarian interventions, since sovereignty has already ceased to exist prior to the intervention. The responsibility to protect bridges the gap between sovereignty and intervention. Chandler’s (2006) critique of external statebuilding operations starts here. In his view, it is a contradiction that states are supposed to be built, while at the same time losing the right to self-government and thereby the main attribute of sovereignty. This

is problematic since it facilitates an erosion of the ties linking power and accountability that further have implications for the legitimacy of the operation, and the policies that are being promoted (Chandler 2006:27). Where Chandler focuses on how it shapes a policy characterised by an avoidance of responsibility by the intervening powers, Paris and Sisk (2007:4) discuss how contradictions are shaping policy dilemmas in the practice of statebuilding.

The first contradiction, Paris and Sisk (2007:4) outline, resembles the argument made by Chandler (2006:7). There is a contradiction between statebuilding interventions, and how it seeks to foster self-government and national autonomy. The second contradiction concerns how the need for local ownership gets the intervening actors involved in identifying who the local leaders should be, and thereby defining what national ownership is in the local context (Paris and Sisk 2007:4-5). The third and forth contradictions point to how ‘universal values’ are promoted as solutions to local problems. It has affected how statebuilding today requires both a clean break with the past, and a transformation of the local society (Hanlon 2006:80). The last contradiction, Paris and Sisk (2007:4-5) emphasise is concerned with how statebuilding operations have short-term imperatives, at the same time as they have long-term objectives.

In accordance with the re-definition of sovereignty and the enhanced policy-focus on the local security situation, it is reasonable to expect that the implementation of reform should also resemble these changes. Following a policy of human security would theoretically require that long-term objectives be followed by long-term imperatives. The durability of peace depends on whether the state building process not only manages to secure the state institutions, but also the situation in the local communities. This is vital in post-war countries like Liberia. Even though a peace has been settled and the international actors are present in Liberia, the root causes for the war needs to be addressed since the underlying factors that triggered the war most

likely are still present (Licklider 1993:10). In opposition to Chandler (2006), Paris and Sisk (2007) are not questioning the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty, but rather questions how these contradictions are taken into account, and how it leads to policy dilemmas in the implementation of reform.

2.3 Favouring governance over government

As it was pointed out in chapter one, the SSR in Liberia has focused on rebuilding the security institutions of the LNP and the AFL, but there has been a lack of involvement by local actors, especially the legislature and civil society (Loden 2007:305). It resembles a shift in state-society relations where there has been a privileging of governance over government in Western approaches to statebuilding (Chandler 2006:22). This is affecting the development of the political community in which the process is taking place. Democracy has in many ways come to be seen more as an end, instead of means in the practice of peacebuilding. Securing the conditions for a democratic election is usually one of the first steps in a peacebuilding operation, but the legitimacy afforded the government and the legislature seems to be downplayed in the following process of statebuilding. As Foucault (1991:102) argues, governance is shaped by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections and by the exercise of power. However, when external actors assume these functions, the distinction between external and internal governance becomes unclear. The redefinition of sovereignty has, as Chandler (2006:10, 2008:11) argues, freed the democratic subject from accountability and further from any political framework where democratic norms are institutionalised. The liberal rights framework has been challenged. The argument by Chandler is not directly a critique of interventions in internal conflicts, but rather a critique of how it is done and the policy behind it. Both governance and sovereignty are circular, meaning that the end of sovereignty, and governance, also leads to the following exercise of it (Foucault 1991:95). What is missing, in this process is a focus on the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship, in which the political community is developing (Chandler 2008:23-24). If

this is the case in Liberia, as questioned in this study, it is highly problematic since conflicting claims over identity was an important underlying dimension of the civil war.

Even though, external governance and democratisation should not necessarily be seen as opposite approaches. As ICISS (2001:44) argues, a period of international governance may better accustom the population to democratic institutions and principles. At the same time, a situation where the formal institutions of democratic rule have been constrained through the implementation of reform, risks enforcing what Mkandawire (1999:123) calls, a 'choiceless' democracy. In the implementation of the SSR in Liberia the characteristics of a democratic reform are not apparent, as long as the process lacks accountability and participation by both the legislature and civil society. By using a PMC to reform the AFL, the role of the government is also reduced (Ebo 2005:24). Privatisation of security not only changes who controls force, but also by which processes it are controlled (Avant 2008:1). The choice of outsourcing the reform of the AFL to a PMC enabled the US to displace the political burden of financing security (Duffield and Reno referred to in Leander 2005:616). The political burden is avoided domestically, in the US, and externally in Liberia. It is avoided externally since the US is released both from the requirements of accountability in the reform, and from responsibility for the outcomes (Duffield and Reno referred to in Leander 2005:616). The implementation of the SSR in Liberia is, due to the lack of local ownership, not coherent with how the SSR is defined (Bryden and Hänggi 2004:9). It represents a dilemma of normative coherence (Chandler 2006:10, Paris and Sisk 2007:6-7) and it is a premise for this case study of the SSR in Liberia.

2.3.1 Governance as peace

Governance seems to have evolved into a notion of peace as governance (Chandler 2002:194, Ignatieff 2003:5 and Richmond 2004:92). It is a peace of external governance that can prolong the dependency of the international engagement, if the external engagement comes to be viewed as what secures the peace (Richmond 2004:97). This is because external governance recreates territorial integrity, human rights, and institutionalises economic, social and political reform (Richmond 2004:92). As Chandler (2002:194) and Ignatieff (2003:5) point out, this means that peace today is seen as ending conflict through governance. The problem with the notion 'peace as governance' is, however, that it risks resulting in a virtual peace (Richmond 2005:83, 97). This is a peace where the liberal democratic state has been implemented without considering the notion of peace as understood in the recipient country, and without involving the local actors in the process (Nathan 2007:9, Richmond 2004:83, 97). Following this argument, the partnership of governance, between the government of Liberia, and the international community, is at risk of alienating the society in the process of reform. If the state fails to provide security for its citizens, the importance of the identity groups grows (Rothchild 2002:8). The identity group becomes a way of securing oneself when the state fails to do so. This is especially problematic in a case like the Liberian since it can enhance the polarisation between the identity-groups, as it did during the civil war².

2.4 Virtual trusteeship

As pointed out in the previous section, a peace of external governance risks resulting in a virtual peace. This is a peace secured by the external engagement, and not by the conditions within the country. It resembles a negative peace rather than a positive peace (Galtung 1969:183-184). The international engagement in Liberia represents a general shift in the degree of intrusiveness in international peacebuilding operations.

² This point will be further elaborated in chapter three.

The mission is of a transitory nature, where the aim of the international presence is to build the capacity of the state, so the state can sustain the structures also after the international actors withdraw from the country (ICISS 2001:44). The mandate for the UNMIL operation was authorised through the UN, but with consent given through the CPA (2003). The international actors are supposed to be consultants of reform rather than controllers of it, but these two roles seem to have been mixed in the international engagement in Liberia. The degree of intrusiveness seems to be quite high.

A dominant international presence may be required to maintain security, and to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement, including the process of initiating political and economic reforms (Avant 2008:7). However, a less intrusive international presence may be required to allow decision-making power that is subject to popular control and accountability. When looking at the case of the SSR in Liberia the consequences that Avant (2008:7) sees as following from a dominant international presence, corresponds with how it has undermined the accountability of the SSR to the legislature and civil society (Ebo 2007:87). It is not a natural consequence, but rather a consequence of the external actors' avoidance of responsibility (Chandler 2006:19).

Although, Liberia is not a trusteeship in the conventional sense of being under full international administration it has characteristics of being a virtual trusteeship because of the scope and depth of the operation (Chesterman 2004:227). Officially, there is a partnership of governance in the process of statebuilding. Krasner (2004:108) defines a partnership of governance as shared sovereignty. According to Krasner, it enables a situation of external regulation, necessary in post-conflict statebuilding. Chandler (2006:43), on the other hand, sees this more as an excuse, enabling the intervening powers to present themselves as facilitating partnership rather than being coercive in their mission. The problem with a partnership of

governance, in a light footprint mission like the Liberian, is that it places the responsibility in the hands of the national authorities, and not the intervening actors who are guiding the process of reform (Chesterman 2004:227). According to the UN (2004:17) there is a responsibility to rebuild, yet in the implementation process the intervening powers seem to distance themselves from the responsibility for the outcomes (Chandler 2006:40, 2008:15). This enables the intervening powers to distance themselves further from the concept of accountability (Narten 2007:8). As will be discussed in the following sections, the possibility for local actors to engage in the reforms are further diminished by the duration aspect of the international engagement, and by the multiplicity of external actors involved in the peacebuilding operation.

2.4.1 A multiplicity of actors

The task of rebuilding state structures to ensure peace and good governance in the state institutions has made the mandates for peacebuilding operations more complex (UN 2003). In statebuilding operations, international actors take over some state functions, while at the same time they are trying to build the capacity of the state. As a result, peacebuilding operations today involve a multiplicity of actors, such as the UN, PMC's, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). This makes it more difficult to place the responsibility in the hands of the intervening powers. A multiplicity of actors can enhance the legitimacy of an operation, but at the same time it can also create problems of co-ordination and accountability (Caplan 2005:35). As Paris and Sisk (2007:6) point out, there are competing lines of authority and budgets when a multiplicity of actors are involved in an operation. Coordination between different programmes is often non-existent, which can make it even more difficult for local actors to approach the process of reform (Paris and Sisk 2007:6). The SSR is for example separated from the DDR process, even though the definition of the SSR implies that it is directly interlinked with other programs of reform (UN 2007:6, 15).

The UN (2000, 2005:71) has through reports on lessons learned, addressed the problems of coordination. The focus has been on how a lack of willingness, consensus, and resources from the member states affect UN-led operations. This corresponds with the argument put forth by Paris and Sisk (2007:4-7) about how long-term objectives are compromised by the lack of resources available for the missions. It is affecting how policies evolve into terms that are easier to operationalise (Bøås and McNeill 2005:212). The financial aspect of a peacebuilding operation has a strong impact on how reforms are taking place, and thereby which actors are involved. It affects how international actors become technical, rather than political in their approaches to statebuilding (Bøås and McNeill 2005:212, Chandler 2006:5-6).

2.4.2 Duration and exit

The lack of international resources allotted to statebuilding operations mean less resources available for each mission, and thereby also affects the duration of it (Narten 2008:11). Rebuilding institutions in post-conflict societies, by external stakeholders, intend to organise government departments and public agencies to discharge their functions both efficiently and democratically (Ottaway 2003:248). In particular, collapsed state institutions, such as the police, the military and the judiciary, means that international intervention has to extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks to include a promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government (Chesterman 2004:2). These objectives resemble statebuilding as a long-term enterprise, but the efficiency aspect caused by lacking resources raises tensions between the means and the aims in the practice of policy implementation (Paris and Sisk 2007:5-6). Efficiency is necessary due to the question of financing the operation, and because of the immediate needs of the country. However, it can also compromise the objectives guiding the operation, and end up negatively impacting the goal of democratisation and good governance (Paris and Sisk 2007:5-6). It becomes a policy dilemma, having to choose between

concluding the mandate within short timeframes, and the need for thorough capacity building.

Although international peacebuilding operations are of a short-term duration compared to the long-term policy objectives, external actors can play a role in reducing the insecurity when it is at its highest. As Hartzell et al. (2001:193) point out, it can enhance the short-term durability of peace. This study partly agrees with this argument, but it is also sceptical of it. It is sceptical as to whether the short-term durability of peace is fostering a consolidated or a virtual peace in Liberia. This is a consideration based on the history of Liberia, and thereby the context in which the statebuilding operation is taking place. Short-term durations can compromise long-term objectives, thus leading to a privileging of governance over government (Chandler 2006:22). As discussed in section 2.4, an approach where government has been subordinated governance enables external actors to distance themselves from the political aspects of reform and follow a technical approach. A technical approach is easier to accomplish since the international actors are not subject to the requirements of democratic governance in its approaches, nor responsible for the political outcomes of it. The technical tasks of screening and training the required number of officers to the LNP and the AFL enable an exit strategy for the involved actors (UNSC 2008:7-8). Technical aims can be counted and quantified, affecting how an approach to capacity building is carried out, in the same manner. As argued in chapter one, it affects the political aspects of statebuilding operations and thereby the question of local ownership.

2.5 A question of ownership

In peacebuilding operations, the concept of ownership tends to be used figuratively, with meanings ranging from a sense of attachment to a programme, to actual controlling authority (Hansen 2005:52). External statebuilding intervention in post-

conflict societies seeks to build functioning and self-sustaining state structures, which would allow the external actors to complete their mission and withdraw (Narten 2008:2). From an international perspective, this is the main reason why local ownership matters. Every UN mission and development programme today focuses on the importance of ownership (Chesterman 2002:6). It is applied to all relevant areas of statebuilding, including the SSR in Liberia. As Hansen and Wiharta (2006:14) point out, if failing to facilitate functioning and self-sustaining state structures, external statebuilding missions risk either becoming open-ended and cost-intensive, or coming to a sudden end without having generated sustainable and self-sustaining structures. That is, it risks becoming a virtual peace. From a local perspective, any emerging post-war state holds the legitimate rights to self-determination and development under international law, and usually has an interest in exercising this right (Narten 2008:2). The focus on rights supports the implied connection between ownership and democracy, which occurred in the 1990s with the emergence of arguments, that democracy was not merely a form of political organisation, but a right (Chesterman 2007:9).

Following the international and local perspectives of ownership, the criteria of ownership become a premise for guaranteeing the long-term and sustainable implementation of post-war statebuilding in Liberia (Narten 2008:2). As such, a commitment to local ownership would also require an approach to policy making and programming that is firmly grounded in local context (Nathan 2007:9). This is an approach where external actors are the facilitators for the design, implementation and management, rather than the imposers of reform (UN 2007:8). As emphasised in chapter one, local ownership has two imperatives (Nathan 2007:7). First, to secure reforms that reflect the local needs and dynamics in society; and secondly to enhance the chances of consolidating peace and the democratic path the country is following (Nathan 2007:7). The UN-led mission in Liberia emphasises the need to include local actors in the process, due to a recognition that a sustainable peace is unlikely to be achieved unless the reform process includes a commitment by local actors (Ebo

2005:ii). However, a dilemma of normative coherence has occurred between the imperatives of operational efficiency and democratic governance (Ebo 2005:ii, Paris and Sisk 2007:5-6). It has affected the degree of local ownership in the SSR, and it can affect whether the local actors can diminish the 'footprint' and the dependency caused by the international engagement (Paris and Sisk 2007:5-6). The approach that is being followed is at risk of undermining the future of self-government.

In a post-conflict context, there is a need to fill the vacuum of domestic authority, but at the same time external statebuilders also need to create conditions for sustainable self-government (Narten 2008:7, UN 2005:30). The problem is, as this study sees it, that it leads international actors to become involved in determining who the legitimate local actors are and should be (Paris and Sisk 2007:4-5). It is contradictory to the aim of self-government and it is increasing the 'footprint' of the international engagement that was supposed to be light. The operation is further at risk of providing an argumentative basis for local spoilers, especially if excluded from the process (Narten 2008:19). In regard to the SSR, security services are more likely to resist reforms that have been imposed on them, than reforms they have helped to design (Nathan 2007:29). Including local actors in the process of SSR could have been a capacity building means to secure, that structures of good governance and democratisation also prevails after UNMIL starts its planned withdrawal in 2010.

2.5.1 Capacity building

Enhancing local ownership could be a key to dealing with the dilemmas of intrusiveness caused by the intervention, and the inconsistency of normative coherence, but it could also mean a long-term commitment for the international community (Paris and Sisk 2007:8). The financial aspect of the international engagement and the need to empower potential spoilers are compromising the need of identifying local actors (Narten 2008:19). However, it is difficult to promote local

ownership when local capacities are at their weakest and local actors lack both expertise and legitimacy (Hansen 2005:305). At the same time, it is problematic if the international authorities are insufficiently receptive to local input and favours their own agencies instead of developing the local capacity to govern (Chandler 2006:22, Forman et al. 2000:17-18). Even though the legislature and civil society tend to be weak in post-war countries such as Liberia, ignoring them can end up reinforcing the problem rather than diminishing it. As emphasised by Narten (2008:11-12):

there is an elementary need for thorough capacity-building in almost every postwar society if self-sustaining state structures built on indigenous technical skills, political competences and a civil culture of tolerant peace and democratic values are to be developed.

Chandler (2006:43) sees the problem of building local capacity as connected to the question of sovereignty. Following his argument, building states without sovereignty does not become easier when the process becomes depoliticised through an approach characterised by the exclusion of those who are supposed to be empowered. As argued in section 2.4.2, a technical approach to statebuilding affects how capacity building is approached in the same manner. The lack of local ownership in the SSR risks undermining the reform as a peacebuilding activity.

2.6 Summary

The different perspectives presented in this chapter focus on how there is a lack of coherence between the policy of statebuilding and the following implementation of it. The question of ownership is vital in this regard, as emphasised through the two imperatives of local ownership (Nathan 2007:7). If the external governance of the peacebuilding operation comes to be viewed as what secures the peace, the peace will

risk becoming a virtual peace (Richmond 2004:83, 97). The specific context, in which a peacebuilding operation is taking place, needs to be addressed to secure that peace prevails also after the international actors withdraw (Nathan 2007:9). Both the state institutions and the security situation needs to be addressed to prevent that the underlying dimensions of the civil war do not continue to pose a risk for renewed conflict. The question of ownership is vital in this regard due to the prospect of self-government, the history of state exclusion and to secure that the peace becomes more than a peace of external governance (Chandler 2006:7, Paris and Sisk 2007:4). This makes it vital to address the research questions at present time, since UNMIL is supposed to start its full withdrawal in 2010. If the SSR comes to be viewed as alienating the local actors in the process of reform, and thus perceived as too intrusive, it will generate resentment against both the international engagement and the government. In chapter four, five and six, the analysis will show how this is the case in post-conflict Liberia. The local actors are alienated in the SSR, it is causing a feeling of resentment against the international engagement and the government, and the security situation is not being addressed. In the following chapter, the background for the civil war will be addressed to enable the analysis to clarify how the underlying dimensions of the civil war still are present in current day Liberia, and how the question of local ownership is important to emphasise because of the history of state exclusion.

3.0 A struggle for state power

The history of Liberia is a story about the destruction of both the state and the social community. It was gradually destroyed during a struggle for state power (Huband 1998, Ellis 1999, Bøås 2005, and Utas 2003). It was a struggle for recognition and inclusion in the political life and it represented the possibility of freeing oneself, and one's identity group from the state of exclusion that resulted from not being in power. It represents a question about how the country should be governed and the resources distributed. As was argued in chapter one, even though the identity groups to a large extent are following ethnic lines, it is more of an identity dimension than an ethnic dimension. Ethnicity has not been static, but rather socially constructed to uphold the practice of neo-patrimonial governance through patron-client relationships (Bøås 2005:77). Ethnicity was polarised and politicised during the rule of TWP, resulting in ethnic cleavages that further widened during the struggle for state power. Even though Liberia was never formally colonised in the conventional sense, it has many of the same colonial characteristics. The history of statebuilding has followed a pattern of exclusion and hierarchical control, increasing the fragmentation of society and creating an environment of polarisation and distrust in, and between, the local communities (Bøås 2001:702, Sawyer 2005:87). Before presenting a historical outline of the civil war in Liberia, the following section will highlight different perspectives by which the underlying dimensions of the civil war has been analysed. The last section will focus on the peace agreement that was reached in 2003, and the legal reference of the SSR.

3.1 Different ways of analysing the war

Stephen Ellis (1999) focuses on a dimension of elite manipulation and religion, - how the war was an outcome of rival politicians who fought for the presidency, and how religion and religious notions were used during the war. Mats Utas (2003) employs a youth perspective where he focuses on their experience of poverty, unemployment

and marginalisation and how it blocked their path to a normal adulthood. Morten Bøås (2005) focuses on the question of identity, how the country should be governed and the resources distributed. Bøås' (2009c) research in Lofa County shows how there has been conflicting claims concerning both citizenship and land rights between the Loma and the Mandingo population. This is again related to the dimension of identity and can be defined as a 'firstcomer-latecomer' conflict. As outlined in chapter one, this is the main perspective in use. According to Bøås (2009b, 2009c), the civil war was made up by several local conflicts, such as the conflict between the Loma and the Mandingo in Lofa County. Recent research by Morten Bøås and Anne Hatløy (2008:44-45) further indicates that the main motivation for joining an armed group during the civil war was to gain security, either for themselves or their family. Civil wars in Africa have also to a large extent been analysed through the 'greed kills' argument, where access to resources is seen as the motivating factor. The contributions from Collier (2000), Berdal and Malone (2000), and Klare (2001) regard African wars as primarily resource wars rather than political wars. These contributions see African civil wars as connected to changes in the global economy. According to Mary Kaldor (2001a, 2001b) it represents a new type of war between armed networks of non-state and state actors that takes place in areas where the modern state is unravelling and where the distinction between public and private, internal and external, do not have any meaning. As will be shown in the following sections, nothing is new about the civil war in Liberia; its dynamics are not new phenomena. The economic dimension of the civil war was important as a motivating factor in and prolonged the war, but it was not what 'triggered' Liberia over the edge. As Bøås (2009b) has pointed out, the root causes for the war is deeply rooted in the Liberian history.

3.2 A history of state exclusion

The Republic of Liberia was established in 1847 as a settlement of freed American slaves, who became known as Americo-Liberians (Utas 2003:96). Although Liberia

was never formally colonised, the Americo-Liberian leadership managed to shape the country in the same fashion as other colonial powers (Clapham 1978:122, Ellis 1999:181, Utas 2003:43). The Americo-Liberians founded the TWP in 1870 and governed as a one-party-state for all but six years between 1870 until 1980 (Ellis 1999:43). Under the rule of TWP, a small elite dominated the political and economical life in Liberia by marginalising the native groups³. The Americo-Liberians thus reinforced the same system of domination they had been freed from (Bøås 2001:702). The constitution of 1847 enforced this system of political governance, by making a clear division between the self and others. The native groups of Liberia were through the constitution ineligible for election and voting, although the constitution of 1847 was patterned on the US-constitution (Utas 2003:43). By the early 1920s the Americo-Liberian elite had secured both political and economical power, and determined the distribution of it (Sawyer 2005:12). It was a redistribution based on the neo-patrimonial governance structures.

Characteristic of the state of Liberia is being bureaucratic and patrimonial at the same time. It has been bureaucratic due to the constitution and the imitation of the US model, but at the same time it has operated through a patrimonial system (Bøås 2001:703, Clapham 1978:129). The regimes in Liberia have been strong since the borders have remained intact throughout the history of the state, but it has also been functionally weak since the regime has been unable to control areas outside Monrovia (Bøås and Dokken 2002:139). It was first in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that the hinterland of Liberia was brought under the control of the government in Monrovia. This was done through giving local elites indirect rule (Ellis 1999:37). The TWP had district commissioners through which they ruled, who again ruled by enlisting local chiefs. The reason for the extension of the governments control to the hinterland was primarily to uphold the country's sovereign status. However, the underdeveloped bureaucracy made this nearly impossible during the

³ There exists 16 major indigenous groups in Liberia: Krahn, Grebo, Gio, Mano, Sapo, Kru, Bassa, Kpelle, Vai, Dei, Mende, Gola, Belle, Loma, Gbandi, Kissi.

first 100 years of the TWP government (Ellis 1999:43). As outlined in chapter one, most of the ethnic groups that exist in Liberia today are a result of the administrative boundaries that were created during the rule of the TWP. Ethnicity was socially constructed to strength the control of the Americo-Liberian elite (Bøås 2005:77). As Sawyer (2005:12) points out: *the seeds of a system of domination and control were planted at the founding of Liberia*. Ruling by marginalisation, as the TWP did, laid the foundation for an increasing amount of tensions in the local communities. Conflicting claims over land rights and citizenship were taking place, increasing the fragmentation of the society, and adding to the experience of insecurity in the local communities (Bøås 2009b). The culmination came with the military coup, led by Samuel Doe, in 1980 and the outbreak of a national civil war in 1989.

3.2.1 The destruction of the state

The rule of the TWP ended when Doe waged a military coup against the government in 1980 and assumed the position as president for the new government (Huband 1998:xvii). The coup was at first applauded by the majority of the Liberian society. The people felt they had been freed from the oligarchic rule of the TWP government, but as Huband (1998:29) has described it: *It was a coup without a plan*. It did not take long before the presidency of Doe was contested, due to its militaristic and authoritarian character (Levitt 2005:198). Doe managed to stay in power and won a rigged election in 1985. This meant a continuation of Doe's military rule, and continued rule through oppression and violence. By 1985, Does government had already shed more blood than the TWP had done during its entire time in government (Levitt 2005:199-201). The experience of insecurity increased in the Liberian society.

The government's formal policy of ethnic stratification increased the tensions and ethnic polarisation in the local communities, which were already planted during the rule of the TWP (Huband 1998:47, Levitt 2005:201). The government of Doe lacked

strong attachments, both to the indigenous groups and to the Western society. This meant that the government did not feel any loyalty to the governing institutions or to the norms that underpinned them (Sawyer 2005:24). The enmity was growing between the government and other ethnic groups. Hence, the prerequisite for the outbreak of war and the self-destruction of the country was there (Huband 1998:32, Sawyer 2005:24-25). Events like the raid that took place in Nimba County in November 1983, enhanced the cleavages between ethnic groups. The raid was launched from Guinea where Doe's dismissed rural minister Dokei had fled. Doe's accusation that Dokei, an ethnic Mano, and Quiwonkpah⁴, an ethnic Gio, were involved in the raid, was meant to both discredit Quiwonkpah and make it an ethnic issue (Huband 1998:33). The Nimba raid became the first clear sign of the Krahn-Gio rivalry that was taking place in the army, a riot that resembled Quiwonkpah and Doe's rivalry over power (Ellis 1999:58). Doe used the military to purge out his opponents, which especially after the Nimba raid caused many Manos and Gios to flee the country and settle in Mano and Gio communities in neighbouring Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire (Sawyer 2005:24). The insecurity in the Mano and Gio communities in Liberia had become too high. It is from these communities in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, that Charles Taylor drew his first approximately 100 men and formed the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Taylor and the NPFL entered Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire on Christmas Eve 1989 (Ellis 1999:75).

3.2.2 The complete breakdown: 1989-2003

Shortly after the NPFL had crossed the boarder to Liberia it split into two factions. Prince⁵ Johnson left the NPFL, followed by a group of the best combatants, and

⁴Thomas Quiwonkpah: The leader of the seventeen soldiers who, together with Doe, murdered President Tolbert from the TWP, the 12th of April 1980 (Ellis 1999:54). The disagreement between Doe and Quiwonkpah, which resulted in his fled into exile, was caused by disagreements about Does intentions of becoming a civilian president and removing Quiwonkpah from the position of commander general in the AFL. Quiwonkpah let a coup against president Doe in 1985. However, the coup was expected, due to information provided by the US embassy, and Quiwonkpah was brutally murdered (Ellis 1999:57-60).

⁵ A common name in Liberia.

founded the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) (Ellis 1999:1). The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was based in Monrovia in 1990, but nevertheless Doe was captured in the ECOMOG camp in September 1990 when Johnson arrived fully armed⁶ (Ellis 1999:9-10). Doe was murdered the following day. Johnson proclaimed himself as being the new president of Liberia, though he quickly lost his dominating position while Taylor managed to increase his. Taylor had gained control of most of the country and was supported by the governments of Libya, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire (Ellis 1999:16).

The regionalisation of the conflict intensified the civil war in Liberia. The regional dimension was there from the beginning and enhanced during the war, especially with the outbreak of civil war in Sierra Leone in 1991 (Sawyer 2005:32). The intensification of the conflict continued with the evolvement of new counter factions and the presence of ECOMOG, who came to be seen as just another faction in the war (Bøås and Dokken 2002:102, Bøås 2001:712). When a peace accord was achieved in 1997 in Abuja, the state of the country had severely deteriorated. The peace agreement led to a democratic election in July the same year (Levitt 2005:210). However, rather than resembling an election for peace, the election in 1997 came to represent an opportunity for the factions to occupy positions in government. The government of Liberia was at this point severely impoverished, yet being in government was an opportunity for the factions to access the facilities offered in a sovereign state and thereby achieve a stronger hold on the resources of the country (Ellis 1999:106-107). Although Taylor's forces were known for countless murders, mutilations and brutality, Taylor won the election. He had the largest administration, and controlled the counties needed to gain enough support. Taylor had again won the struggle for state power, but this time through a democratic election. Through

⁶As it has been pointed out by Ellis (1999:11), theories exist that both the US and ECOMOG were aware of Johnson's visit to the ECOMOG camp that day. ECOMOG is the security cooperation between the West African States. It was founded on Nigeria's initiative, and Nigeria was as the regional superpower the dominating actor during ECOMOG's operation in Liberia (Bøås and Dokken 2002:100-101).

Taylor's authoritarian rule, the same practice of neo-patrimonial governance continued, as did the looting, violence and oppression.

In 1999 Taylor was faced with increasing insurrections. The largest insurrection groups were LURD who came in from Guinea in 1999, and MODEL who was founded in 2003 and backed from Côte d'Ivoire (Levitt 2005:223). LURD consisted primarily of youth from the Mandingo population, while MODEL mainly consisted of former supporters of president Doe. This increased the polarisation in the local communities. In Nimba County, where the majority of the population are either from the Mano and Gio groups, and where the Mandingos are the minority, LURD's attack on Ganta in 2003 amplified the resentment against the Mandingos. The attack aimed to exact revenge on the Mano and Gio population, since Taylor's forces mainly were composed of Mano and Gio combatants (Bøås 2005:81). LURD managed to take control of the city, but only for a short period of time. The Gio and Mano militia manage to conquer Ganta in the wake of Taylor's departure into exile. By April 2003, the counter factions to Taylor controlled approximately 60 % of the country. Even though Taylor still controlled Monrovia and had the capacities to fight back, he accepted the Nigerian offer of exile on the 11th of August 2003. This paved the way for the CPA in August 2003.

3.3 The CPA

The CPA (2003) is the peace agreement from 2003 between GoL, LURD, MODEL and the political parties in Liberia. The agreement resulted in a document that outlines the principles to which the parties commit themselves; a call for international assistance, the mandate they are given, and the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). The composition of the NTGL was a compromise between GoL, LURD and MODEL who were the main factions from the last phase of the civil war. LURD and MODEL stood out as winners of the war, but

since the two groups consisted mainly of people from the minority groups Mandingo and Krahn, they did not have a chance of winning the upcoming election and thereby ‘winning the peace’ (Bøås 2009d). The NTGL showed no signs of improving the legitimacy in the political practice during its period of transitional governance from 2003 to the democratic election in 2005⁷. The interest of the parties in the NTGL seemed to be a possibility to enriching themselves, rather than a genuine commitment to the transition period itself (Bøås 2009d).

3.3.1 The legal reference for the SSR

The legal reference for the SSR in Liberia goes back to the CPA from 2003. The SSR is covered by the CPA’s part four, article VII and VIII and by the UN resolution 1509 from the 19th of September 2003 (Jaye 2006:4). Article VII in the CPA concerns the reform of the AFL. It states that the parties request that ECOWAS, the UN, the African Union and the International Contact Group on Liberia should be involved in the reconstruction of the army and that the US should play a leading role in this process. In addition, it enabled the parties to draw from the ranks of GoL, LURD, MODEL and civilians. Article VIII of the CPA concerns the immediate restructuring of the LNP, the immigration force, the SSS, and other security institutions. The article calls for the UN Civilian Police to undertake the training of the new LNP and monitor its activities. The UNSC resolution 1509, states that the UN shall support the reconstruction and the monitoring of the LNP, and that it shall assist the transitional government of Liberia in transforming the AFL in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organisations, and other interested states (Jaye 2006:5).

The articles in the CPA (2003) and in the UN resolution 1509 are referring to the principles that shall guide the reform, and which actors shall be involved in the

⁷ The first round of the presidential election took place in September 2005. The second round where Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won the election took place in November the same year.

process. In addition to the SSS, the LNP, and the AFL, there exist eight other security institutions⁸ (Jaye 2006:6). These are in the CPA described as institutions that should also undergo demobilisation and reconstruction, but no external actor is through the CPA obligated to undertake these reforms. In addition to the SSS, the LNP and the AFL, the immigration and the custom security guards are mentioned as institutions that should be reconstructed immediately. These reforms have not yet been undertaken.

3.4 Summary

The state of Liberia has a history of state exclusion from its very foundation. This practice generated the social cleavages in the Liberian society that laid the conditions for the outburst of a national civil war in 1989. It was 14 years of struggle for state power; a complete breakdown of what was left of state institutions, and an increasingly fragmented nature of society. The civil war has been analysed through different perspectives, highlighting youth (Utas 2003), elite manipulation and religion (Ellis 1999), and identity related to citizenship and land (Bøås 2005, 2009b, 2009c). Research by Bøås (2009b, 2009c) further shows how the civil war was composed of many local conflicts that intermingled into a national conflict. The different perspectives on the civil war and the historical background will be used in the following analysis as a contextual framework to compare present day Liberia against.

⁸ Natural Security Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Drugs Enforcement Agency, National Fire Service, Ministry of National Security, Monrovia City Police, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation, Bureau of Customs and Excise.

4.0 Governance of the SSR

The governance of the SSR in Liberia is an intriguing subject, since theoretically it is a partnership of governance between the international actors and the government. As previous research (Ebo 2005, 2007 and Loden 2007) has shown, there is a lack of ownership by the legislature and civil society in the SSR. As will be illustrated in this chapter, the question of ownership in the SSR is not straightforward. It represents an uneven partnership both between the external actors and the government, and between the government and the rest of the society. The following sections will discuss how the governance of the SSR is taking place; how the prioritising of governance has led to a neglect of government, and thereby the democratic aspects of the reform; and why the local actors are not assuming the degree of ownership that is available to them. The questions of ownership and how the partnership of governance works are important to emphasise in a post-conflict context. As discussed in chapter two, it can affect both the future of self-government of a reform like the SSR, and further the entire state- and peacebuilding process (Chandler 2006, Paris and Sisk 2007).

4.1 An uneven partnership of governance

Through the CPA, the UN was called upon to facilitate a consolidated UN mission in Liberia. That the external actors have been called upon to exercise a degree of administration without being explicitly authorised to do so, correspond with how Chesterman (2004:227) has defined a light footprint model of intervention. The light footprint model implies that the governance of reform will not be too intrusive in its form, but rather be a partnership between the intervening powers and the national authorities in Liberia. The formal responsibility for the outcomes lies not with the intervening powers, but with the national authorities they have been called upon to assist (Chesterman 2004:227).

The governance of the statebuilding operation in Liberia is theoretically a partnership between the international actors and the government, but it is a partnership that differs according to the different sectors of the statebuilding process. In opposition to Krasner's (2004:108) argument that a partnership of governance is necessary in post-conflict societies, Chandler (2006:43) argues that it rather creates a possibility for the international actors to present themselves as partners instead of coercive actors. The argument of Krasner (2004:108) corresponds with how the civil war left the Liberian state in a political vacuum, in need of external assistance and regulation (Bøås and Hatløy 2008:37). At the same time, the degree of external governance in the SSR, compared to the lack of involvement by local actors, points to Chandler's (2006:43) argument that it is an uneven partnership, where the governance of the reform has been privileged over government. By privileging governance over government, the democratic principles have become subordinated the governance of it. This is a paradox between the international governance of reform, and the democratic principles that ought to reflect the governance structures of the state, since the state is supposed to be a democracy.

The democratic election in 2005 represented a significant phase in the ongoing peacebuilding process. It has been termed the first free democratic election in the history of Liberia (Bøås 2009b). However, the legitimacy that the government and the legislation were given through the election has been significant downplayed. The SSR is one obvious example. One can argue that this is necessary during a transitory period because of the history of illegitimacy in the governance of the state, and due to the need of rebuilding functioning state structures (ICISS 2001:44, Krasner 2004:108). At the same time, it is problematic because of the democratic path Liberia is following. It represents a dilemma of normative coherence between the policy of the SSR and the implementation of it, and it is affecting how the democracy that is being promoted has come to resemble a 'choiceless' democracy (Mkandawire 1999:122, Paris and Sisk 2007:6-7). As Nathan (2007:9) argues, the SSR should as a

democratic project ensure that local ownership is not confined to the government, but broadened to include the legislature, civil society and the public.

As outlined in chapter one, there are four agendas of the SSR, a political, an institutional, a social, and an economical (Chanaa 2002:28-30). The political agenda should promote democratic governance through the management of the state; however, the political agenda has been downplayed in the external approach to the SSR. This has affected both the social and the institutional agenda. The social agenda should be concerned with the role and the inclusion of civil society and the media, but the depoliticised approach has led to these actors not being given the role they should have had in the reform. The lack of a political agenda in turn results in a lacking institutional agenda. The institutional agenda should ensure that the capacity of the local actors is built, in order to secure a receiver to govern the sector democratically, also after the international actors withdraw (Chanaa 2002:28-30). The fourth dimension, the economical agenda, is concerned with the budget and the resources of the sector. The economical agenda is affecting the number of officers being trained, how they are trained, the amount of external actors involved in the process, and the duration aspect of the UN mission.

Instead of following the four agendas of the SSR to secure local ownership, the approach has become highly technical and the political aspects have been left to the government. Thus separating the political and the technical side of the SSR. Yet, it is the international actors who are defining what the competences of the state are. This is usually a tactic of governance reserved for the state (Foucault 1991:103). It makes the partnership of governance more artificial, and further blurs the distinction of roles between the external actors and the government in question (Chandler 2006:9,91). It fosters a lack of transparency in the process, and an increasing feeling of alienation among the local actors. This indicates that the external approach to the SSR is

alienating the local community through the implementation of reform, relating to the third research question of this study.

4.2 The LNP

In the reform of the LNP, UNPOL has a half-executive mandate. This means that the national authorities have a degree of ownership in the process of reconstructing the LNP. It is the government of Liberia who has the task of appointing the leaders of the LNP. This corresponds with how the formal responsibility lies in the hands of the national authorities, and not the international actors. By placing the responsibility for the outcomes of reform with the national authorities, UNPOL is also released from the question of accountability to the local actors. The responsibility of the government to appoint the leadership of the LNP can be seen as positive due to the question of local ownership in the reform, but it is also problematic. There is no requirement that the leadership shall have a background from the police, and the leadership of the LNP was characterised, by the informants from UNPOL and the LNP, as the main problem in the institution of the LNP today⁹. This could be an argument for what ICISS (2001:44) and Krasner (2004:108) point to - is a need for strong external regulation for a period of time. However, it can also be seen in accordance with Chandler's (2006:5-6) argument that statebuilding operations are too technical in their approach, and a calling for a more political focus where political capacity in the state is also built. As Chandler (2006:6) argues, it is not possible to build capacity in the state, when those whose capacity is to be built are excluded from the process. Still, the reform of the LNP represents a more transparent process, compared to the reform of the AFL. This is due to the differences in the mandates, and how the reform of the LNP has proceeded faster than the reform of the AFL. In addition, the police are operating in the communities, and identified by the informants as the closest representatives from the state.

⁹ From interviews with representatives from UNPOL and the LNP. Monrovia, May 2008.

4.2.1 The LNP as a symbol of the state

Civil society groups in Monrovia have had meetings with the government, where they have expressed their concerns about the LNP. However, the concerns have not been related to the question of ownership in the reform. The informants from the different civil society groups were especially concerned with arming the LNP and getting the LNP to arrange community meetings. They saw the meetings as an opportunity for the people to raise their concerns and get more knowledge about the new LNP, thus committing the LNP to work more for the people and less for their own benefit. The information gathered in both Monrovia and Nimba County show that the reformed police force lack public trust. The informants compared the new force with both the LNP as it was during the civil war, and how it was prior to the war. Their perceptions all pointed to the same conclusions; the reformed LNP does not distinguish itself significantly from the police force during the war; and the LNP as it had been prior to the war was deemed preferable. As one informant rhetorically asked me¹⁰: *what is the change? I cannot see it*. This is disturbing since the police are seen as the closest representatives of the state because they work in the field between the people and the public. The police are, as Foucault (1991:92) points out, the down-wards line of governance. As such, community meetings could enhance the transparency, the accountability, and the inclusiveness to the people, and thereby help address their concerns. I was supposed to attend a community meeting in Paynesville, the district in Monrovia with the highest crime rate, but the meeting was cancelled. This was not surprising, according to the informants from civil society and the LNP. Because, even though community meetings are on the agenda in the LNP, this is still more evident in theory than in practice.

Although the LNP is seen as a symbol of the state, the criticism against the new LNP today was not expressed as criticism of the government. The criticism from officers in the LNP, civil society and community actors were twofold. They saw it as a

¹⁰ Patrick Bamakpa, member of the local peace consul in Saniequillie. Interviewed in Saniequillie, the 24th of May 2008.

consequence of the lack of resources in the LNP, and as a consequence of the multiplicity of different nationalities involved in the reform. The reform was experienced as intrusive since UNPOL was seen as following its own traditions instead of a Liberian. Following Nathan's (2007:29) argument, this is problematic since security services are more likely to resist reforms, they have not helped to design. Civil society, the government and informants from the LNP found it difficult to challenge the reforms of the LNP and the AFL. As an informant from the LNP¹¹ expressed it: *people dangerously in need do not have a choice and therefore it becomes an international issue*. The problem with this perception is, again that even though the international community is conducting the reforms, the responsibility for the outcomes are the national authorities'. The international engagement is designed to exercise influence, but without assuming formal responsibilities. It increases the distance between the UN-led mission and the local actors rather than transforming the societies in accordance with the policy of statebuilding and democracy promotion (Chandler 2006:70). The lack of a political aspect in the SSR has also affected negatively the institutional and social dimensions in the reform. This strengthens the indication made in section 4.1 that local actors are alienated in the process of reform.

4.3 The AFL

In accordance with the CPA (2003), the US took the lead in the reform of the AFL. However, the CPA did not request the US to take exclusive control of the reform, as the US did when they outsourced the task to DynCorp. Members from both the Ministry of Defence and the fighting factions felt excluded from the process, since they were not consulted when the decision was taken (Loden 2007:300). The main argument against the reform has concerned the choice by the US to reconstitute the AFL, instead of merely reconstructing it, as requested through the CPA (Loden 2007:300). The choice by the US to outsource the reconstruction of the AFL to a

¹¹ Gboulou C. Koulou IV, commissioner for the police of administration and professional standard. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 7th of May 2008.

PMC is questionable since using a private contractor changes the means by which a reform takes place (Avant 2008:1). The reconstruction of the AFL by a PMC has to a larger degree undermined the democratic aspects of the reform, excluding not only civil society and the legislature, but also the elected government. The criteria of accountability, transparency and participation have been undermined. As the ICG (2009:14) states, there are specific limitations when using a PMC. Ebo (2007:88) shows how civil society groups and the legislature have been denied access to a copy of the contract between the US and DynCorp. However, the interviews with the representatives from DynCorp revealed that not even the Minister of Defence has seen the contract. It is a contract between the US and DynCorp, by which DynCorp only follow orders from the US. This further weakens the idea that the governance of reform is a partnership of governance.

The choice of outsourcing the reform of the AFL to a PMC is also questionable when one looks at the initial request from the parties in the CPA (2003). The CPA requested support, but since the task of reconstruction was outsourced to a PMC the degree of accountability and transparency in the reform has also been weakened. It has resulted in a higher degree of intrusiveness in the international engagement, which in accordance with Narten's (2008:8) argument contradicts with how the engagement is supposed to be a light footprint model of intervention. The tasks left for the Ministry of Defence are the tasks of making strategic goals for the future of the AFL. They are outlining what kind of role the military shall have, and what kind of legislation is going to govern it. In the words of the representatives from DynCorp¹²: *training is only the minor part*. Like UNPOL's role in the reconstruction of the LNP, the task of DynCorp is a technical task, and not one of building local actors' capacities to govern the institutions.

¹² Representatives from DynCorp, interviewed in Gbarnga the 13th of May 2008.

It is interesting how the historical relationship with the US affected how the informants viewed the reform of the AFL. Except for the members of the SSR working group, the informants did not question the use of a PMC, since they saw it as representing the US. The informants were more critical of the reform of the LNP by UNPOL, since UNPOL consists of many different nationalities, which the informants felt had led to an inconsistency in the training of the LNP. An interview with Vice President Boakei¹³ also showed how he as a government representative did not want to question the US outsourcing decision. The Vice President felt that the assignment of the US to be in charge of the military training was a way of strengthening the bond to the US, so that Liberia could benefit from the United States African Command in the future. It was because of the possibility of such an arrangement that he did not want to question the approach to the reform. The statement from the Vice President resembled a feeling of dependency on external assistance more than it was a genuine belief that the US will come to the rescue if conflict arises again. As the report by the ICG (2009:6) also states: *If history is a guide [...] an expectation that the U.S. would come to Liberia's rescue is misplaced.* There is, as will be elaborated further in chapter five, a strong feeling of insecurity about the future. The informants feel dependent on international assistance in order to secure prevailing peace.

Although the criteria of democratic governance appears significantly weakened by DynCorp's role as a PMC, the government has had opportunities to involve itself more in the reform than they have done. The informants from DynCorp expressed how the Ministry of Defence has not given any clear signals about wanting to enhance communication between itself and DynCorp. This corresponds with how the Ministry of Defence, prior to the last recruitment tour in May 2008, has not chosen to go with DynCorp when recruitment was conducted¹⁴. This is especially noteworthy since the recruitment process started already on the 18th of January 2006, and since

¹³ Vice President Joseph Boakei. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 22nd of May 2008.

¹⁴ From the interviews with representatives from DynCorp and the Ministry of Defence. Gbamga, the 12th and the 13th of May 2008.

the Ministry has had opportunities to go with DynCorp on earlier recruitment tours. The explanation is partly to be found in the lack of economic incentives for the Ministry of Defence to get involved. Giving allowances to representatives from the Ministry could have been an incentive for the Ministry to follow the process more closely. This has been used in the new LNP where there has been developed a duty manual¹⁵, making it possible to deduct salary from the police officers wages if they do not appear for work. It has been developed in order to give the officers an economic incentive to do their job. The complaints from the Ministry about the externally led reform are primarily based on their lack of control and access to the finance. The prospect of self-government, and the question of sovereignty are adding to the merit of these complaints. At the same time, the reform has to acknowledge the history of state corruption, thus making external regulation of the finances an important dimension of the reform.

Although one can talk about a lack of local ownership in the reconstruction of the AFL, there are still possibilities to take more ownership in the reform than what the government and civil society have done. It is not merely a question of having a reform that is accountable, transparent, and open for participation by local actors; a genuine commitment by local actors is also required, as the UN (2007:8) calls for in its reports. At the beginning of the SSR in Liberia, the international actors were more open for dialogue with the local actors and the possibility of involving them. This quickly changed though, since the local actors who had the chance to involve themselves, did not seem particularly willing to do so. This raises a new question as to why the local actors are not taking advantage of the degree of ownership they have access to. The following sections will discuss three interlinked possible explanations to this.

¹⁵ The police duty manual was completed in December 2008 (ICG 2009:19).

4.4 Ownership not taken

The first explanation is that the international actors are not expected to be sufficiently receptive to local input. In correspondence with Chandler's (2006:22) and Forman's et al. (2000:17-18) argument, this is a concern which will always be present when international actors are involved in a reform, due to how it compromises the development of local capacity. This is especially evident in the reform of the AFL, since the use of a PMC has changed the means by which the reform is conducted (Avant 2008:1). The lack of local capacity represents the second explanation. The development of such capacity is important since state institutions are still weak. Civil society, the legislature and the government are still lacking democratic capacities to assume the monitoring and participating role that is available. As previous research conducted by Bøås (2005), Ellis (1999), Huband (1998) and Utas (2003) show, the civil war destroyed what remained of state institutions, infrastructure and civil society.

The international community expects national authorities to govern in accordance with the principles of democratic governance, even though the international actors themselves are not obligated to. This is a dilemma of normative coherence, as Paris and Sisk's (2007:6-7) argue. Since the responsibility for the outcomes lie in the hands of the national authorities, the intervening powers are released from the responsibility for the outcome, and thereby also from the following principles of accountability, transparency and participation (Chandler 2006:19, 44). By not following the principles of democratic governance in the implementation of reform, the intervening powers are therefore by their actions not consistent with what they expect the future governance of Liberia to look like. This leads us to the third explanation, which is the technical approach that characterises both the reform of the AFL, the LNP and a reform program like the DDR. As the informants from UNPOL and DynCorp emphasised, their task is a technical task. It is a 'train and equip' task¹⁶. The political,

¹⁶ From interviews with representatives from DynCorp and UNPOL. Gbarnga and Monrovia, May 2008.

social, and institutional agenda are not at work in the SSR, diminishing the role of the local actors and strengthening the experience of alienation.

4.4.1 A lack of local capacity

As the analysis so far has shown, the lack of involvement by local actors is not only caused by the intrusiveness of the international engagement, but is also due to the lack of local capacity needed for these actors to assume a participating and supervising role. In the approach to the SSR, there is a focus on the institutions of the LNP and the AFL. However, there is a lack of focus on the institutional agenda of building the capacity of the local actors who are going to govern the sector. The report by the ICG (2009:15) shows how the Ministry of Defence still lacks basic management capacity, and has problems with administering the payrolls and welfare of the soldiers who have already completed their training. This is highly problematic since the SSR is soon to be completed, and the Ministry of Defence will be in charge of the new AFL. In addition, the financial responsibility will increase when the international actors withdraw, meaning that the Ministry of Defence have to do more with less (ICG 2009:16).

Interviews with civil society actors also revealed that the number of civil society groups concerned with the SSR was few, and as previous research has shown, these are not involved in the reform in terms of having a monitoring or participating role (Loden 2007:297). DynCorp has had meetings with civil society groups during the process of recruitment, but the effect of this has been limited since few civil society groups are knowledgeable of or concerned with the SSR. The exception was the SSR working group. As the informants from civil society emphasised, the lack of knowledge and participation in the reform can affect the future monitoring role by civil actors. The civil society groups who were not knowledgeable about the reform, argued that if there had been more focus on involving them in the process, they would

also have gained more knowledge about it, and become more interested in supervising it. This argument corresponds with Chandler's (2006:6, 43) argument about how it is difficult to build a state when those whose capacity is supposed to be built are excluded from the process. It is important to address this argument, since the international actors are perceived as more transparent and accountable than the government and state institutions, even though the international actors lack transparency and accountability in the SSR. Even DynCorp was included in this interpretation of the international actors.

The government was to a large extent seen as bearing the public blame for the lack of involvement by the legislature, civil society and the community actors. Civil society actors focused on how they do not experience the international actors as exclusive in their approach, but rather that it is the government who excludes them; outlining that it should be handled at the level of the international stakeholders. The government was seen as running the country exclusively with the help of the international community. This indicates that the uneven partnership of governance between the government and the international community to a large extent is a tacit partnership. The distinction between internal and external governance has been blurred, making it difficult for the local actors to recognise who is governing the reform (Chandler 2006:9, 91).

The informants' feeling of exclusion was connected to the background of the government representatives. The government is primarily composed of Liberians who have been living outside Liberia for many years, primarily in the US. Informants from civil society and the community actors are feeling as though the government has a different way of thinking. This is not necessarily negative, but it becomes so when people experience that the government is not listening to the ideas of people who have lived in Liberia all their life. Civil society and community actors feel that the people, including themselves, have been alienated from the statebuilding process.

This is problematic for the prospects of self-governance of the sector, especially because of the polarised nature of the society and the history of state exclusion¹⁷. The feeling of alienation experienced by the local actors corresponds with the lack of political, institutional and social dimensions in the SSR, and strengthens the validity of the research questions asked.

The uneven partnership of governance is both a consequence of the external approach to the reforms, and of the lack of local capacity, which would have enabled the local actors to involve themselves. The two consequences are interlinked. If the approach had been more political in its character, it would also have focused more on securing democratic governance, thus building the capacity of the local actors. The problem is that it would have necessitated a longer commitment by the intervening powers (Paris and Sisk 2007:7), and thereby not facilitated an exit strategy for the full withdrawal of UNMIL, supposed to commence in 2010. As Chesterman (2002:6) points out, ownership matters in every UN operation, since it allows the international community to complete their mission and withdraw. The requirement of ownership changes however, as it has done in the SSR, when the implementation of reform follows a technical approach by which the external actors are released from the political aspects of it.

4.4.2 A technical approach

It is problematic that the external actors are released from the political aspects of the reform, as the main problems in the SSR are political rather than technical. Training new security forces are important for the security of the country, however it is a problem if the local actors taking over the leadership of the forces lack the capacity to govern the sector. As the leader of UNPOL in Liberia¹⁸ pointed out: *we will stumble*

¹⁷ See chapter three, and the further analysis in chapter five and six.

¹⁸ Henrik Stiernblad, leader of UNPOL in Liberia. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 21st of May 2008.

if we do not have someone at the receiving end that is ready and capable to assume full responsibility. So we cannot come away from the question of ownership. The representatives from DynCorp and UNPOL did not think that there, at present time or in the near future, would be a receiver able to govern the sector.

It is claimed in the international community that SSR can be successfully achieved in 4-5 years. However according to informants from the international actors this is a dupe expectation from the international community when it comes to the difficulties of reforming security forces. Building up an institution to contain both a new force and democratic governance takes more than 4-5 years, which is usually the timeframe for SSR¹⁹. An enhanced focus on the political aspects of reform, and thereby on local ownership, could have increased the chances of finding a receiver to govern the sector in accordance with the principles of democratic governance after the UN withdrawal. This is important both for the institutional and the political dimension of the SSR. As emphasised in section 4.1, the political agenda of the SSR determines the management of the sector, and should promote democratic governance, while the institutional agenda should secure the capacity of the local actors to govern it (Chanaa 2002:28-29). By lacking an adequate receiver, dependency on international assistance has increased. Embracing local ownership affects to what degree the local actors can diminish this dependency, caused by the external actors (Paris and Sisk 2007:5-6).

By not decreasing dependency, the externally driven statebuilding operation is working against its own goal of fostering self-government. The economical dimension of the SSR is compromising the political, institutional, and social agenda of it. These dimensions are needed for the SSR to resemble a democratic project, as the policy of the SSR indicates it should be (Nathan 2007:9). The policy

¹⁹ From interviews with representatives from the international actors in Monrovia, May 2008.

implementation of the SSR is undermining the political aspects of the reform. This has caused a lack of local ownership in the reform, and in accordance with the imperatives of local ownership (Nathan 2007:7) it is, as questioned through the main research question, undermining the SSR as a peacebuilding activity.

The representatives from UNPOL were concerned with the lack of focus on building up a functioning organisation, which is needed to supplement the efforts of the technical competences being built. The focus of UNPOL has been solely on reconstructing the LNP and monitoring the force. As a result, the focus of the operation has mainly been concentrated on Monrovia. The primary focus on Monrovia is at odds with both the context of the civil war and the present context²⁰. This coincides with how the technical approach resembles a state-centric rather than a people-centric approach. A technical approach is easier to standardise and implement, from one case to another, but the problem is, as Doornbos (2003:58) points out, that change may enter the equation irrespective of the dynamics that led to the conflict in the first place. This is happening in Liberia, as will be illustrated in chapters five and six. In the following two sections, the focus will be on how the international actors are dealing with the history of illegitimacy in the AFL and LNP, and how the technical benchmarks for the SSR are seen as facilitating the withdrawal of UNMIL.

4.4.2.1 Dealing with the history of illegitimacy

In the reconstruction of the LNP and the AFL, the illegitimacy of the previous armed forces has been acknowledged. During the recruitment to the forces, a screening and a vetting process has been undertaken to ensure that the recruits are not war criminals. In the case of the AFL, the whole force was demobilised²¹, as a part of the

²⁰ These points are further elaborated in chapter six.

²¹ Interview with a representative from DynCorp. Gbarnga, the 13th of May 2008.

larger DDR process²². This was a demobilisation of approximately 27000-30000 soldiers, including militias supportive of the government²³. It is the first time in history that a standing military force has been demobilised. In comparison, UNPOL has deactivated 3500 officers and vetted 4500 in the reform of the LNP (Loden 2007:299). Demobilisation can be seen as necessary due to the history of illegitimacy in the forces, but it also creates the challenge of securing a successful reintegration of ex-soldiers and officers. Reintegration is vital in order to make sure that demobilisation does not end up reinforcing the problem it was meant to solve.

The issue of demobilising the old forces and then retraining new forces is according to the legislature, civil society and community actors a contested issue. Members of the former AFL have been demonstrating against the demobilisation of the force, and together with members of the legislation, they have contested the demobilisation by referring to the CPA (2003). The CPA called for a restructuring of the former AFL, while not dissolving it. The informants acknowledged that it was important that war criminals did not enter the force again, but they also contested the approach of the international actors. They did not think that it was possible to solve the problem of illegitimacy in the forces by substituting personnel. The informants emphasised how it is difficult to identify war criminals when many of the former rebels used different names during the war. Also, the screening process involved publishing pictures of recruits in newspapers, which only a minor part of the population has real access to. Real access means living in a city where newspapers are available, being able to afford buying it, and being able to read. In addition, the informants found it difficult to distinguish between war criminals and war victims since so many people both fought at some point in the war, and were victims in another. This argument

²² The DD components of the DDR ended officially in November 2004. At this time 102193 had been registered as disarmed, 92714 as demobilised, and 11484 as reintegrated (Jennings 2007:208-209).

²³ Abraham Mitchell, program analyst and consultant for the SSR program in the Governance Commission. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008.

resembles research done by Ellis (1999:133) about how most of those who fought, were victims at one stage of the war and offenders at another.

The process of demobilising and training, as well as the international standards inherent in the SSR, were seen as representing a standard international approach that was not developed in line with the context of the situation. The lack of coordination between the two processes of DDR and SSR has made it even more difficult for the local actors to approach the reform. There are competing lines of authority, and budgets, between the two processes, since a multiplicity of actors are involved in the operation (Paris and Sisk's 2007:6). The technical approach the international actors have followed in the DDR and the SSR has affected the degree of coordination between the two processes. The approach does not include a political aspect that could have enhanced the degree of transparency and accountability between the reforms (Paris and Sisk 2007:6). Following a technical approach also made it possible for the US to outsource the task of reconstructing the AFL to a PMC. The reforms are, as will be discussed in the following section, focusing more on reaching a goal than on the process by which it is being reached.

4.4.2.2 Exit and the technical benchmarks

The reform of the LNP has, as mentioned in section 4.2, proceeded faster than the reform of the AFL, but the criteria for recruitment to the LNP have also been lowered. They were lowered to ensure that the benchmark of 3500 officers was reached, with a 20 percent female share (UNMIL 2008:9). The duration aspect is connected to the amount of resources available to the operation, and has affected how the criteria for recruitment have been lowered. Since the withdrawal of UNMIL is related to success in the SSR, it has been important to reach the benchmarks to ensure the requisite for withdrawal (UNSC 2008:7-9). It represents a technical measure, and does not correspond with the agenda of the SSR. This indicates that the policy of the

SSR, in the process of implementation, has evolved into terms that are easier to operationalise (Bøås and McNeill 2005:212). There is a political pressure from the international community to reach the benchmarks of reform within the timeframe that has been given. As was emphasised by an informant from the international actors, a police force is the aim, but the quality of it does not seem to matter.

The 3500 police officers that according to the benchmarks had to be recruited have undergone what the informant defined as a bad training program that is not durable. The focus is on the conventional police force, but the standards of recruitment have been lowered and many officers are not able to fulfil the tasks required of a conventional force, such as reading and writing reports. For the informants, the inconsistency in the training further enhanced the feeling of external intrusiveness in the process of reform. A functioning security sector is the end goal, but the process by which it is reached has been neglected. These findings strengthen the argument made in chapter one and two about how statebuilding operations needs to be more process-oriented instead of primarily focusing on the end product that the operation seeks to achieve.

When one look at the state of Liberia in 2003, it would have been difficult to ensure that the political aspects of reform were also addressed. The state institutions had collapsed, and not much was left of civil society. As Abraham Mitchell²⁴ from the governance commission expressed it: *Liberia was virtually on its knees*. Under those circumstances, it is difficult to ensure that the implementation of reform also coincides with the policy framework of it. The NTGL came to represent an illegitimate government, and it would have been difficult for the international actors to identify local actors to cooperate with. On the other hand, the democratic election in 2005 represented a new phase in the peacebuilding process in Liberia. Even so, the

²⁴ Abraham Mitchell, program analyst and consultant for the SSR program in the Governance Commission. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008.

international approach to the SSR came to resemble a highly depoliticised approach, thus alienating the local actors. The government, legislature and civil society are still weak in post-conflict Liberia, but by ignoring local actors the reform is at risk of reinforcing the problem, rather than diminishing it. This is vital to the prospect of self-governance when UNMIL starts its withdrawal.

4.5 Summary

The technical approach that has followed from the external governance of the SSR has undermined the political, institutional and social agenda of the reform. The political responsibility for the outcomes lies in the hands of the government and not the international actors, thus releasing the external actors from the political aspect of the reform (Chandler 2006: 40-41, Chesterman 2004:227). The governance of the SSR is officially a partnership, but in the process of implementation it has come to resemble an uneven partnership between the government and the international actors, and between the different local actors themselves. The legislature and civil society is not sufficiently involved to fulfil the monitoring and participating role it should have had if the SSR was to be a democratic project (Nathan 2007:9). This represents an artificial partnership of governance, blurring the distinction between the internal and the external political spheres (Chandler 2006:9, 91). The lack of a political agenda has affected how the approach to the SSR has become highly technical, and it has diminished the degree of local ownership in the reform, thus alienating the local actors. As argued in chapter one, enhancing local ownership in the reform would not automatically lead to a better outcome, but the local actors need to be empowered in order to be able to govern the sector democratically also after the international actors withdraw. The international engagement seeks to foster self-government and national autonomy (Paris and Sisk 2007:7). This contradicts with the lack of focus on the political, institutional and social dimension of the SSR. In the following chapter the discussion will turn to how the security situation and the SSR is experienced in the local communities, and how this experience relates to the question of ownership.

5.0 An experience of insecurity and alienation

In the previous chapter, focus was on how the governance of the SSR resembles a prioritising of governance over government. It was discussed how the technical approach by the external actors and the lack of local capacity for involvement affect the degree of local ownership in the SSR. In this chapter the analysis will take the discussion a step further by discussing whether the technical approach to the reform are corresponding with the security challenges as they are experienced in the communities. The chapter will start by presenting the empirical findings. These enables a discussion of the consequences caused by a gap between the external focus on the security institutions and the security as it is experienced in the local communities. It will further be discussed whether local ownership is affecting this gap, and thereby represents an independent variable as indicated through the research questions asked. There will be made a distinction between Monrovia and Nimba County since the findings differentiate between Monrovia as the capital, and Nimba as a hinterland county.

5.1 A distinction between Monrovia and Nimba County

The security concerns in Monrovia and in Nimba County differ on two main aspects. Firstly, in regard to the difference in how they experience the security situation in their community, and secondly, their view of the LNP and the AFL. The feeling of insecurity expressed by the informants in Monrovia is caused by the immediate security threat of higher crime rates and the lack of trust in the LNP. The insecurity as it was experienced in Nimba County, meanwhile, was based on how they are experiencing dynamics of conflict still present in their communities. The dynamics they pointed to were ethnic and tribal tensions, land disputes, and the huge amount of not reintegrated ex-rebels. The issue of land was identified as the greatest security challenge to be overcome, as it is refuelling the ethnic and tribal tensions, which contributed to the war. These concerns were identified as security issues at risk of

endangering the peace. The informants in Nimba County felt that the prerequisites for conflict are still apparent in their communities. They made a distinction between insecurity caused by increased crime rates, and the insecurity that the combination of land disputes, ethnic and tribal tensions, and the number of ex-rebels was causing. As one informant in Ganta described the difference between the two types of insecurity²⁵: *There is a difference between the immediate insecurity feeling that makes it difficult to go to sleep and the insecurity feeling that comes when the prerequisites for a conflict is apparent.*

How the informants experienced the security challenges in turn affected how they viewed the SSR. In Monrovia there was a focus on how no change had appeared in the LNP. The same perception about the LNP was apparent in Nimba County, but additionally, they thought the choice of reconstructing the security institutions was the wrong place to start the reform since the real security problems are in the communities where the new forces are recruited. The informants did not have an opinion about the AFL since they had not yet seen the results of the process. The real test for the AFL will, according to the informants, first appear if conflict arises again, or as many people in Ganta expressed it when conflict arises again.

5.1.1 Enhanced crime rates and the LNP

There has been a steady increase in the crime rates in post-conflict Liberia, especially when it comes to armed robberies. This has led those who can afford it to hire private security guards to protect their homes, while those who cannot afford it have become more insecure. The insecurity caused by the rising crime rates is connected to a lack of trust in the reformed police. This may change some after the new law on armed robberies was adopted on June 23rd 2008 (ICG 2009:20). Under the new law, armed

²⁵ Zawolo Z. Zuagele, former representative of the legislation for Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD) during the interim period, 2003-2005. Interviewed in Ganta, the 14th of May 2008.

robberies are no longer bail-able and the death penalty can be used if armed robberies result in a death (ICG 2009:20). Still, the officers in the LNP feel insecure since they are not armed, while most of the criminals are. The consequence has been that many police officers avoid approaching the scene of crime when they know the criminals are still there. Especially in the hinterland, approaching a scene of crime becomes even more difficult due to the lack of vehicles and resources to fuel them. This has resulted in incidents where police officers have either stolen fuel or used extortion to get their vehicles fuelled.

Extortion and corruption are causing problems in the LNP. If one follows a Western definition of corruption, the corruption-rate in the LNP is at a higher rate compared to a Liberian understanding of corruption. This became apparent during the journeys from Monrovia to Gbarnga, Ganta and Saniquillie. We were stopped at almost every checkpoint and asked for what is referred to as ‘small money’. It is not regarded as corruption in the conventional Western sense, but it is rather seen as a necessary means of survival. The international community is in comparison less affected by this since the cars of the international organisations are rarely targeted (Bøås 2009d). This coincides with how it was not me - assumed to be an NGO worker - but the Liberian driver who was the target for extortion at the various checkpoints. The practice of extortion and corruption is still widespread in the institution of the LNP. As an informant who investigates corruption in the state emphasised²⁶: *everyone is corrupt, including me, but some are just more corrupt than others.*

5.1.2 Mob violence

The escalating crime rates in Liberia have been accompanied by ever more mob violence due to the lack of confidence in the police. Police stations have been burned

²⁶ In accordance with the principle of ‘do no harm’ the identity of this informant will not be revealed. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 8th of May 2008.

down in both Monrovia and in the hinterland caused by a public frustration towards the fact that criminals often walk free after a crime has been committed. As an informant from the LNP pointed out²⁷: *So people think why involve the police, they will just recycle the criminal, so we as individuals should be responsible for our own security and then they take the law in their own hands.* The information I received about mob violence was confirmed by personal observation when I witnessed a robbery in the centre of Monrovia. The robber was discovered and immediately after a growing crowd of people started chasing him. He took refuge in a hotel nearby, where the hotel guards closed the gates to save him from the crowd. The crowd was composed of a diversity of women and men of different ages who kept on trying to get the hotel guards to release the robber to them before the police would arrive. The observation corresponds with the statements made by informants about the lack of trust in the police, and it affirmed the public concern of dealing with the enhanced crime rates and the insecurity they are experiencing. Even though many of the problems with detaining criminals primarily are due to a lack of reform in the justice and correction system, the police are the ones who get the public blame. This was by representatives from civil society and the LNP, seen as damaging the statebuilding process, since the police are an important symbol of the presence of the state.

5.2 Land disputes as re-enforcing ethnic and tribal tensions

According to the informants in Nimba County, ethnic- and tribal tensions were an important dimension during the war. This aligns with previous research (see Ellis 1999). The findings from Nimba County showed how ethnic and tribal tensions are currently being refuelled by the increasing amount of land disputes. This is due to how land disputes increasingly follow ethnic and tribal lines. The conflict potential in these dimensions were described as a widening cleavage since the various dimensions are more interlinked today than they were prior to the war. New research from Bøås

²⁷ Gboulou C. Koulou IV. Commissioner for the police of administration and professional standard in the LNP in Monrovia. Interviewed in Monrovia the 7th of May 2008.

(2009c) also shows how the issue of land, and the question of belonging to it, was an important underlying dimension of the civil war. As Ellis (1999:39) points out, status, name and history are all related and affects claims over land in Liberia. It is a 'firstcomer-latecomer' conflict over land, which appears both between and within ethnic groups, and between different tribes.

As pointed out previously in chapter one, the majority of inhabitants in Nimba are from the ethnic groups Mano or Gio, while the Mandingo population is a minority group. The Mandingo population is by many Liberians regarded as outsiders, who do not really belong in Liberia. This goes back to the origin of the Mandingos in Liberia and is therefore important to focus on. The Mandingo population originally came to Liberia as traders from Guinea. In Liberia, they came to control many of the central trade routes throughout the country. The executive branch of the TWP preferred giving trade concessions and licenses to foreigners like the Mandingo traders, because the risk that these would use commercial positions to build political constitutions was small (Ellis 1999:45). Under the presidency of Doe, the practice of commercially privileging the Mandingos continued. This concerned primarily the Mano and Gio in Nimba County, where the Mandingos acquired commercial privileges and state employment (Ellis 1999:61, 65-66). The resentment against the Mandingo population was further strengthened during the war, when the Mandingos were first associated with Doe and later with LURD, who went against GoL, and attacked Ganta in 2003. However, when the war ended the Gio and Mano militia controlled Ganta. This explains why the refugees from the Mandingo group have been the latest to return back to Ganta after the war ended.

I was in Ganta on the National Unification day²⁸, chosen as one of the main returning days for Mandingo refugees coming back from Guinea. My observation, which was

²⁸ In May 2007 President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf declared the 14th of May as the National Unification Day.

confirmed by the informants in Ganta, was that the Mandingos who were coming back seemed afraid and that the people in Ganta seemed sceptical of the returning refugees. The scepticism was twofold. It was due to how they associated the Mandingos with LURD and the destruction of Ganta in 2003, and it was grounded in land issues. An interview with a Mandingo chief²⁹ in Guinea further illustrated how some of the Mandingos have delayed the time of their return, waiting for their claim over land to be granted. The Mandingo chief did not think that his claims over land were a negotiable issue. He further pointed out that he himself would not take up arms or encourage it, but that he did not know how far the younger generation would go to get their property back. The statement by the Mandingo chief corresponds with the non-negotiable line that the informant from the NRC³⁰ described as apparent in land dispute negotiations. The informant used an example from a negotiation, where the Danish Refugee Council had been involved. It had quickly fell apart after the representatives from the Mandingo group stated that there were two possible outcomes; either they got their land back, or if necessary they would fight until the last drop of blood had left their bodies. These statements should not necessarily be interpreted literally, but they do give a notion of the potential conflict dimension inherent in land disputes in the county.

Both sides find it difficult to compromise when it comes to the issue of land. After the war ended, there have been systematic efforts by some Mano and Gio in Ganta of occupying property not belonging to them, in order to discourage the Mandingos from coming back³¹. The absence of the Mandingos have constituted an opportunity for the Gio and the Mano to take back the land that they feel is originally theirs and take control over the trade that was the Mandingos' domain prior to the war (Bøås

²⁹ Interviewed by the Danish Phd. student Jairo Munive. Market area in Guinea, 10-15 km from the border-crossing to Ganta. The 15th of May 2008.

³⁰ Nyahn Flomo, who works with the NRC and Radio Kergheamahn in Ganta. Interviewed in Ganta, the 26th of May 2008.

³¹ From the interview with Nyahn Flomo, the 26th of May 2008 in Ganta. Also emphasised in forthcoming work by Bøås (2009c).

2009c). This corresponds with how the findings in Ganta showed, major land disputes in Ganta to be disputes over the valuable market areas. The findings further confirmed the point made by Bøås (2009c) about how the Mano and Gio believe that they are the real owners of the land. As a way of protecting themselves as a minority group, the Mandingos have to a large degree presented their claims on land as a group, rather than as individuals. This makes it even more difficult to negotiate, since it turns individual disputes to group disputes, thus enhancing the cleavage and the tensions between the groups.

The correlation between land disputes and tribal and ethnic tensions in Nimba County points to an identity dimension in present day Liberia. It is a dimension of identity based on the correlation between ethnicity, tribalism and the issue of land and ownership. This corresponds with how Bøås (2009c) shows how identity also was an important underlying dimension of the civil war. The people of Liberia want peace, but at the same time the informants expressed how there exist issues that are not negotiable. As an informant from the Mano ethnic group stated³²: *Our people must know that the Mano, Gio and Mandingo want to live together, but they [Mandingo] should understand that this country actually belongs to us since they came from Guinea.* The quotation substantiates the importance of the identity dimension. The identity group has been a way of securing oneself, when the state has not been able to (Rothchild 2002:8). The tensions between the identity groups are on the increase in Nimba County, especially in Ganta. This amplifies the importance of the identity group. Reforming the security institutions were not seen as addressing the security situation, and the informants did not expect, neither the AFL nor the LNP to become guarantors of their security. As indicated through the second research question, there is a gap between the SSR and how security is experienced in the local communities.

³² Former commander, who now works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in May 2008.

5.2.1 A local and a national dimension

Land disputes are not only apparent in Nimba County, but are taking place all over the country; and some disputes have resulted in violent incidents (ICG 2009:8). In June 2008 in Kakata, Margibi County, fifteen persons were murdered and five are still missing after a land dispute erupted into violence (UNSC 2008:3). This incident involved both a senator and a political opponent, giving the conflict a political dimension. The UN is aware of the potential conflict dimension land disputes causes. The latest progress-report on Liberia from the UNSC (2008:3) outlines how local conflicts, like the incident in Kakata, have the potential to evolve into a national conflict (UNSC 2008:3). This was what happened during the civil war, when many local conflicts got entangled in each other (Bøås 2009b). Still, the UNSC (2008:7-8) expresses belief in the same report, that the completion of the SSR will lay the foundation for the withdrawal of UN forces. This is a contradiction in the UN-led operation, between the security situation and the focus on the state institutions. It is a contradiction that risks undermining not only the SSR, but also the entire state- and peacebuilding operation, as questioned in the main research question. Chapter six will discuss in more detail how the tensions that are apparent in the communities are already directly undermining the efforts of the SSR.

5.2.2 A problem of reintegration

The two-fold scepticism against the Mandingos in Nimba County, is affecting the amount of rumours about incoming attacks from Guinea. Rumours, that just two months before my arrival in Ganta, had gathered approximately 400 youths in the main street armed with hoes screaming *come, come, we are ready*³³. As the former

³³ From the conversations with the Danish Phd. student Jairo Munive and the interviews with: Dohr Cooper, former commander in the NPFL, who now works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in Ganta the 26th of May 2008. Amos S. Yini, former commander in the AFL and GoL, who now works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008. Ernest Hamburg, works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in Monrovia the 28th of May 2008.

commanders of the NPFL and GoL³⁴ pointed out, there are still many ex-rebels who have not been reintegrated. Ex-combatants who feel that the condition of war was more like a peace for them, and are just waiting for an opportunity to take up arms again³⁵. As Hartzell et al. (2001:190) emphasise:

[...] parties following a high-intensity conflict may prove “trigger-happy”, ready to interpret seemingly innocuous moves by their opponent as a violation of the terms of the settlement, and through responses of their own, contributing to the breakdown of the settlement.

Even though the reaction by the youth in Ganta was a result of rumours, it illustrated the feelings of fear and alert in the youth which would prompt a reaction if an opposition-group should make such ‘innocuous moves’. The main problem with the DDR, as the local informants viewed it, was that the approach had followed a standard UN approach instead of being locally based. As they pointed out, local actors know who the ex-rebels are, and they know how to approach them. Many ex-rebels have not been reintegrated, since they have chosen to sell the id-cards they received at disarmament, or since they never were accepted as ex-rebels because they did not have any arms to hand in when the process began.

Re-integration is, as Jennings (2007:213) points out, a question about *reintegration into what?* The internationally funded DDR has had little effect on reintegration (ICG 2009:6). As with the SSR, the DDR should have acknowledged the community in which the reform is implemented, and the local actors who are the targets of it

³⁴ Amos S. Yini, former commander in the AFL and GoL, who now works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008. Ernest Hamburg, works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in Monrovia the 28th of May 2008.

³⁵ This corresponds with previous research conducted by Mats Utas (2003:249) on how ex-combatants in Liberia experienced their life prior to the war, during the war and after the war ended.

(Jennings 2007:213). The security challenge caused by unsuccessful reintegration is increasing, since land disputes are refuelling ethnic- and tribal tensions in the local communities. If violence erupts over these issues it can, as the ICG (2009:7) argues: *serve as a pretext or springboard for other forms of violence*. Within the LNP, UNPOL has developed an Emergency Response Unit (ERU) to deal with riots and violent crimes. However, it is not the responsibility of the ERU to counter large-scale armed threats. Neither is it the responsibility of the AFL, who publicly has been ruled out for this assignment (ICG 2009:18). It is presently unclear who is responsible for dealing with an eventual armed insurgency. In other words, the governance structure is unclear.

5.2.3 A regional dimension

The international engagement is primarily focusing on the capital, but the main security challenges are in the hinterland. This corresponds with how the civil war also started in the hinterland. The location of Nimba County, with its borders to Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, gives the security challenge a regional dimension. This was of great focus in Ganta since the city is situated at the border to Guinea. The regional dimension was seen as important to focus on, not only because of the ongoing process of returning Mandingo refugees, but also due to the regional dimension of the civil war. The importance of the regional dimension is further enhanced by the many claims on land being fronted by Mandingos who have not yet returned from Guinea. The informants in Monrovia also focused on the regional dimension, due to how the regionalisation of the civil war in Liberia prolonged and intensified the conflict.

There are representatives from the various security institutions at the formal border crossings, but there are still many crossings that are not controlled. In the training of the AFL, there is a regional aspect to make the force more integrated in the region.

However, it is questionable if a force of 2000³⁶ can be regionally effective, even though Liberia is a small country. The situation along the borders to Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone are presently stable, but the situation in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire is still insecure and could affect the situation at the borders in Liberia (UNSC 2008:2, 7). The consequences of the coup in Guinea in December 2008 are still to be seen, and the upcoming election in Côte d'Ivoire is expected to become strongly contested (ICG 2009:6). This can result in further insecurity at the border, enhancing the possibility of a 'trigger-effect' if riots erupt in the neighbouring countries.

5.3 A feeling of alienation

The findings from both Monrovia and Nimba County show that the informants in both areas feel their security concerns are not being addressed. They expressed a need for the international community to take into consideration the factors leading to the war in 1989. The state-centric approach of the SSR is not experienced as benefiting their security situation. There is a gap between how the institutional focus of the SSR is being implemented and how the security situation is experienced on the ground, providing answer to the second research question. The informants feel that they have been alienated from the reform. This detachment is not due to the lack of involvement in the ongoing reconstruction of the security forces, but because of the lack of focus on the security situation in the communities. They feel neglected by the government and the international partners, whom they feel has not focused enough on how the security is experienced in the communities of the hinterland. The experience of alienation confirms the point made in chapter four, thus strengthening the answer of the third research question.

³⁶ An AFL of 2000 was the choice of the US based on an estimate of what the country could sustain economically. In 2005 the plan was initially to train an AFL of 4000 (Ebo 2005:19).

Even though the government is launching a land reform, the informants in Nimba County were sceptical of the reconstruction of the security institutions since there is still a need to deal with what they saw as the main security challenges. The approach to the SSR is experienced as intrusive and not in correspondence with the context, and thereby experienced as an excluding process. This has affected how confidence in the SSR, and by extension the state that is being built, has decreased. This is problematic because, as Narten (2008:19) argues, it provides an argumentative basis for potential spoilers. The reform is experienced as alienating the local communities through its implementation; a result of how the SSR is not in line with the local context.

5.3.1 Embracing the concept of local ownership

Informants in both Monrovia and in Nimba County embraced the concept of local ownership. It was seen as an important element in the SSR due to where the focus of attention should have been, and due to the notion that it is within the local context that the reform of the security sector should be carried out. The lack of a people-centred approach was seen as detrimental to the future of good governance in the state, especially because of the prospect of UN withdrawal. As a representative from the SSR working group expressed it³⁷: *How can you barber when I am not there? If you do not take the peoples concern into consideration after putting all those millions into the reform, we are going to go back.* The quotation highlights the argument made by Chandler (2006:27), and Paris and Sisk (2007:4) about the contradiction that the international actors are aiming to facilitate self-government, without involving the actors it concerns. The international community has, as Bøås (2009a) points out, been too busy making plans for Liberia that they never really considered whether the plans they have made are in accordance with the situation in the country.

³⁷ Caroline Bowah, coordinator for the SSR working group. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 20th of May 2008.

Following Nathan's (2007:7) definition of local ownership, an enhanced focus on local ownership in the SSR could have made the reform more in line with the local needs and dynamics in society. It would also have made the reform more democratic, increasing the chances of consolidating peace and democracy (Nathan 2007:7). Building the capacity of local actors, in accordance with the principles of democratic governance, is difficult when the local actors are not involved in the process (Chandler 2006:6, 43). Involving local actors is not only important in regards to the future of democratic governance of the sector, but also to encourage the legislature, civil society and the public to assume the participatory and monitoring role which should be apparent in a democracy. As Caplan (2005:197) points out, accountability, transparency and participation are fundamental components to the exercise of any democracy.

If the SSR had been more locally based, it could have diminished the degree of intrusiveness caused by the external actors, and thereby facilitated a more transparent and inclusive reform. The problem is, again, that this would require a long-term commitment by the external actors and required additional resources. When going from the policy of statebuilding to the implementation of it, an efficiency aspect emerges, due to resources available (Paris and Sisk 2007:6). The efficiency aspect affects the duration of the international engagement, and together with the complexity of the mandate, it affects which and how many external actors are involved in the operation (UN 2003). As was shown in chapter four, the question of ownership is complicated further by the lack of local capacities in the state; whether the local actors are assuming the degree of ownership that they can; and the difficulty of identifying local actors in a country that is divided. The lack of local ownership affects how the SSR is viewed as a peacebuilding activity in the Liberian society. The question of ownership matters when it comes to identifying the root causes of the conflict and identifying how the security situation is in the local context. This indicates that an enhanced focus on local ownership could have diminished the gap

that has developed between the state-centric approach to the SSR and the security situation.

5.3.2 A divided people

As this chapter has shown the cleavages that were apparent during the war are still apparent in current-day Liberia. This makes the task of identifying local owners more complicated, since it is not possible to talk about national actors and thereby national ownership. The concept of national ownership was dismissed, by the informants, as not relevant in the context of Liberia. Community and civil society actors expressed how they could not talk about national ownership, since they did not know who the real owners are. Liberia is not united. As an informant³⁸ said to me: *when you talk about national actors I do not know whom you are talking about because the national actors are divided*. The point made by Bøås (2009d) is reconfirmed; the Liberian society is still a deeply polarised nation. As was emphasised in the background chapter, the history of Liberia is a history of state exclusion where the polarisation of groups has been socially constructed (Bøås 2005:77).

Although it is difficult to identify whom the local actors are or should be the approach to the SSR would have been experienced as more locally anchored if it had been more people-centred. In the Liberian environment of division, the nation does not exist as a cultural entity. Individuals are primarily loyal to their own tribal and ethnical lineages (Lundin 1996:86). The government of Liberia has, however, made some effort to address this issue. The National Unification day is an initiative to strengthen national unity. Still, not much has been done so far to make Unification day resemble it. Unification day was chosen as a returning day for a large group of Mandingo refugees to send a signal of unification, but this choice lost its symbolic

³⁸ Dohr Cooper, former commander in the NPFL, who now works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Interviewed in Ganta the 26th of May 2008.

effect since the population of Ganta did not really know what the day meant and nothing had been done to raise awareness of it. The only experience the informants in Ganta had of Unification day was that it was an official day off from work for those who work in the public sector. The choice of Unification day as a returning day for Mandingo refugees was by community actors in Ganta seen as accentuating the presence of a potential conflict, instead of addressing the issue of national polarisation.

That the people of Liberia are so divided makes it all the more important to address local needs and involve local actors in the process of reform. The state that is being built has a task of ensuring that the leadership of it is a leadership to the whole society. It is essential to make sure that the state does not fall back on the practice of exclusion that has dominated politics throughout the history of Liberia. If the state is not able to sustain a leadership for the society as a whole, the outcome will most likely be renewed conflict (Hartzell et al. 2001:185).

5.3.3 A peace of external governance

The informants in Monrovia were positive about the future since the international actors are present, but informants in Nimba County were nevertheless worried about the prospect of UN withdrawal. Even though the war has been settled, little has been done to address its underlying dimensions. Security has been improved but the peace is fragile, and people still feel dependent on the international engagement. The feeling of dependency is based on the acknowledgement that there are still problems in the communities. There are challenges that need to be addressed to secure that the problems of the past do not become the problems of the future. This is an intriguing aspect, since the international presence is viewed as what secures the peace and because the implementation of reform does not correspond with how the security is experienced in the society. The argument by Chandler (2002:194), Ignatieff (2003:5)

and Richmond (2004:92) that governance has evolved into a notion of peace as governance, corresponds with how the informants experience the international presence as securing the peace. This is problematic since it prolongs the dependency on the international engagement (Richmond 2004:97).

The peacebuilding operation risks resulting in a virtual peace, because the notion of security, and thereby what secures the peace, is considered differently by the local actors compared to how it is approached by the international engagement (Richmond 2004:83). Hartzell et al. (2001:193) argue that intervention by external actors can enhance the possibilities of short-term durability of peace, which they emphasise is the most insecure phase in a post-conflict context. The end of the civil war reflects an insecure phase in post-conflict Liberia, but as the findings from Nimba County also show, the feeling of insecurity has been increasing in parallel with the increasing potential renewed conflict-dimension. The feeling of insecurity has been increasing, even though international actors are still present in the country. Again, this shows how the specific context in which the peacebuilding operation is taking place, matters. By not considering the local perspective of the security situation, the SSR is alienating local actors in the reform, which indirectly undermines the efforts of the SSR as a peacebuilding activity. This is connected to the lack of a political agenda, as emphasised in chapter four.

5.4 Summary

The peace is still fragile in Liberia and the external governance is regarded as what secures the peace, especially in the hinterland. This chapter has shown how the enhanced crime rates and the lack of trust in the LNP constitute an immediate feeling of insecurity both in Monrovia and in Nimba County. At the same time, an underlying conflict dimension over identity is causing a more profound feeling of insecurity in Nimba County. The identity dimension derives from the correlation

between land disputes and ethnic and tribal lines. Identity was an underlying dimension of the civil war and has only been strengthened in the aftermath of the war. Compared to the pre-war situation, these dimensions seem to have become more interlinked, since the cleavages were widened during the war. The informants feel alienated from the process of SSR, due to the lack of a local perspective on how the security situation actually is in the local communities. It is important to focus on a local perspective because of the historical and continuously polarised nature of Liberian society, and since the international presence is viewed as what secures the peace. It resembles a peace of external governance, as the approach to the SSR fails to correspond with the local context (Chandler 2002:194, Ignatieff 2003:5, Richmond 2004:92), The result is a gap between the state-centric approach to the SSR and the security situation. The last chapter of analysis will discuss how the security challenges are already undermining the SSR as a peace building activity, both directly and indirectly.

6.0 From the communities to the AFL and the LNP

In chapter five it was shown how tremendous security challenges remain in Liberia, generating a context of continuous insecurity. The feeling of insecurity is caused by the rising crime rates, a lack of confidence in the LNP, the renewed potential conflict dimension over identity and the question about ownership of land. The huge amount of not re-integrated ex-rebels is adding to the insecurity caused by these dimensions. The security challenges are undermining the efforts of the reform both directly and indirectly. Indirectly since the root causes for the civil war are still present in the society. This has developed into a renewed potential conflict dimension that could end up undermining the efforts of the SSR directly. This chapter starts by illustrating how the security challenges, as they are experienced in the communities, are already shaping some of the problems apparent in the institutions of the LNP and the AFL today. The following sections will then discuss how this is related to the external actors' state-centric approach, and finally how the external and the internal security architecture differentiate.

6.1 No change in the LNP

Even though the LNP has been reformed, not much has actually changed in the force. Extortion is still common practice. *Maybe the uniforms are the new thing* was a common statement from both civil society and community actors when asked about the new police force. The LNP officers seem to lack incentives to fulfil their duty, since they lack the economic incentives to it. The lack of resources affects both logistics in the force and the salaries given to the officers. A regular LNP officer earns 83 US dollars a month, after the tax of 7 US dollars has been deducted. In comparison, a bag of rice costs approximately 40 US dollars. According to informants from the LNP, this has left them with two options; either to have another job on the side, or using their role as officers to gain 'small money'. At the same time, it would be difficult to raise the salaries in the LNP in a country where the

average salary is 55 US dollars a month, and the state budget is severely low³⁹. Furthermore, the police officers were demoralised by the lack of change in the justice system, which is negatively affecting the public view of the LNP. There is a variable willingness among the officers to do their job, since incentives for fulfilling the vision of a reformed police are not there. They did not gain any honour by joining the police force.

As we saw in chapter five, there are ethnic and tribal dimensions in Nimba County. These dimensions are also affecting the reformed police. LNP officers are using their position to protect and help their own people. When looking at the history of the state in Liberia, this is not a surprising finding. It resembles a practice that has been, and still is, expected in a polarised nation like Liberia. It is problematic that even though the international community has spent a huge amount of resources on reforming the LNP, not much has actually changed in the practice of the new force. There has been a change in the training of the LNP, but in the field their work resembles to a large extent the previous practice of conduct. In terms of recruitment, there has been a focus on getting a LNP that is representative of the different ethnic groups. Even so, nothing so far indicates that it has changed the practice of behaviour in the LNP. Civilians especially in the hinterland are still experiencing officers discriminating between ethnic groups. The difference between the capital and the hinterland is connected to, how the identity dimension is more profound in the hinterland. However, there was no indication of conflict between the different ethnic groups in the force. This can again be seen as related to how most of the trained police officers return to their own community to serve.

To address the issue of identity, it is necessary to both look downwards on what role identity has in society, and upwards to the leadership of the LNP. As pointed out in

³⁹ According to Vice President Boakei the budget was 276 million US dollars in 2008. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 22nd of May 2008.

chapter five and four respectively, identity represents a potential renewed conflict dimension, and the leadership is regarded as the main problem in the LNP. If large-scale insurgency should erupt it is, as discussed in chapter five, unclear who is supposed to intervene; it is neither the task of the ERU nor the AFL. The future governance structure is still as unclear as the governance of the reform is for the public. This is highly problematic for the future governance of the sector, especially if insurgency erupts.

6.2 Ethnicity and rivalry in the new AFL

The practice of ethnic and tribal discrimination has, according to representatives from the international actors, also started to happen in the Ministry of Defence. The practice of doing friends favours based on ethnic and tribal bonds are taking place. Due to the history of state discrimination between different social groups, it is also reasonable to question the choice of the Minister of Defence to give his brother a higher position in the ministry. The practice of privileging social groups is clearly integrated in Liberian society. This heightens the importance of addressing the question of local ownership and thereby having a process inclusive of different social groups rather than exclusive. When one looks at the reform of the AFL, the weight of this argument increases. Ethnic tensions have surfaced between recruits in the new army under construction. There have been several incidents where recruits from the Mandingo group have been harassed and beaten up by recruits from other ethnic groups. The Mandingos not only have problems with the Mano and Gios, but they are a generally disliked group in Liberia since many Liberians see them as historically illegitimate citizens of the country (Ellis 1999:39).

As with the reform of the LNP, the reform of the AFL has also focused on training a force that is representative of the different ethnic groups. Again the main problem goes downwards to the communities where the recruits are enlisted, and upwards to

the leadership of the force. By the SSR's lack of focus on these two dimensions, the main problems in the security sector are not addressed. As questioned through the main research question, it is undermining the SSR as a peacebuilding activity.

6.3 The state-centric approach and the local context

In the international approach to the SSR, focus has been on the security of the state by primarily focusing on the institutions of the LNP, the AFL and the SSS. Reconstructing security institutions is, as an informant from UNPOL pointed out, something concrete and easier to comprehend both for the intervening parties and for the people. Officers in uniforms are visible in the society, representing a signal of forthcoming change. The problem occurs when changes fail to appear, when expectations of change are not fulfilled. Due to the financial and durational aspect of the international engagement, it is easier to complete a process of reconstructing institutions than trying to deal with the root causes of conflict. The problem is, again, that it is from the domestic society that recruits are drawn and the problems in the communities will be reflected in the new institutions. These are security challenges that can end up jeopardising the whole reform if they are not addressed. The informants from Nimba County could not see the point of reconstructing the AFL and the LNP when the real security problems are in the communities where the new forces are recruited. As Zawolo Z. Zuagele⁴⁰ pointed out: *the process is lacking a holistic orientation, which it needs, in order to have a chance at succeeding*. Security institutions are an important dimension when rebuilding a state, but needs to be a part of a broader framework to be able to work as a peacebuilding activity in Liberia. The human-centric definition of the SSR and the imperatives of local ownership suggest that the implementation of reform should have been more orientated toward local security considerations, thus aiming to deal with the root causes of the conflict that are developing into a potential renewed conflict dimension.

⁴⁰ Zawolo Z. Zuagele, former representative of the legislation for APD during the interim period, 2003-2005. Interviewed in Ganta, the 14th of May 2008.

6.3.1 The policy actors and policy-making

As was discussed in chapter four, the policy actors of the SSR are both the international actors conducting the reform, and the national authorities who are outlining the future policy for the institutions. It is a contradiction that focus has been primarily on the state institutions, when the security situation in the hinterland to a growing degree is undermining the efforts of securing the state. This is a contradiction of policy making, but again the policy-making goes back to the policy actor. As Foucault (1991:102) outlines, governance is formed by the institutions, their procedures, reflections, analysis, and furthermore their exercise of power.

The international actors are experienced as intrusive, since the policy of the SSR did not include a focus on the local experience of security and insecurity. It is not focusing on the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship in which the political community is developing (Chandler 2008:23-24). Although the international approach was seen as incompatible with the context in which it is being implemented, the concern was primarily related to the national authorities' role as a policy actor and future policy maker. This corresponds with how the responsibility for the outcomes lies in the hands of the national authorities. However, it does not coincide with the intrusiveness caused by the international engagement. According to civil society and community actors, the international community made a wrong choice when deciding to follow a security of the state mentality instead of a mentality of the people's security. This was related to how a people-centred approach could have enhanced the inclusion of local actors in the process, and thereby enhanced the focus on the communities. It would also have obligated the government to be more inclusive in its future policy-making. However, as argued in chapter four, this is dependent on whether the political agenda of the SSR is achieved. The political aspect is as Chandler (2006:19, 41) argues, a significant aspect of a statebuilding approach. By the international actors avoidance of it, they are also avoiding the responsibility that follows with intervention.

Promoting legitimate officers in the LNP and the AFL is not the main challenge. Rather it is related to the history of Liberia, and the tradition of unevenly distributed welfare between social groups. As emphasised by the editor of Star Radio⁴¹: *when you have the power, the rest of the society are in your hands and you can use the staff because you have the authority*. The history and memory of state exclusion is distinctly apparent and shows how Liberia is still a polarised nation. By not including local actors in the SSR and not focusing on a local perspective, the external actors are enhancing the experience of alienation, which is already well known in Liberia.

The national authorities are seen by the intervening powers as representing the national actors since they are the democratically elected authorities, but in the eyes of the public, one cannot speak of national actors since the state is still so fragmented. It is problematic that the government is approached as the only national actor, even though they were democratically elected, since the state represents such a highly polarised nation. As Bøås (2009d) points out: *the elections had produced a winner, but not a unified nation*. It is a contradiction that the international actors are involved in determining who the national actors are, and thereby also who the legitimate actors are (Paris and Sisk 2007:4). In a polarised nation like the Liberian, the alienation that people are experiencing enhances the resentment against both the international actors, and the elected government. There are, as the community actors in Ganta emphasised, key local actors in their situation who are not recognised. This worsens the division that is already there and further gives it a political dimension. The government, as a policy actor, is getting the political blame for a policy that has not been particularly inclusive. This is happening in spite of the fact that the partnership of governance has been an uneven partnership for the government as well. As pointed out in chapter four, the informants viewed the international actors - even DynCorp - as being more transparent and accountable than the government. The informants were sceptical as to whether a legitimate government actually had been installed. However, this was also

⁴¹ Wellington G. Smith, editor in chief at Star Radio. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 30th of May 2008.

connected to the lack of knowledge about the governance structure of the SSR. The partnership of governance has come to resemble a tacit partnership, where the governance structure is unclear for the local actors who are not included in the partnership (Chandler 2006:9, 91).

6.3.2 Between an external and a local security architecture

The externally led SSR goes back to the mandate and legitimacy of the international engagement in Liberia. The externally led statebuilding operation is first and foremost legitimised by the mandate given through the CPA (2003), and secondly through the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty in the international community. In accordance with the re-conceptualisation of sovereignty, sovereignty had already ceased to exist prior to the intervention since the state had failed to provide for its citizens. The people-centred definition of sovereignty, which partially gave UNMIL its legitimacy, is not corresponding with the state-centric approach followed in the implementation of the SSR. The institutions of the LNP and the AFL are being rebuilt, but the political aspects of the reform have not been prioritised. There are both political and technical challenges in the security institutions under reconstruction, but it is the political problems that risk undermining the institutions, and further the peacebuilding operation. These are political problems of democratic governance, and of unheard ideas and challenges in the communities. These ideas and the challenges experienced in the communities are not political in the traditional Western sense, but are still political for the people concerned (Bøås 2008). As pointed out in chapter one, reality exists both as ideas and experiences, as much as it exists as material and social reality (Rubin and Rubin 2005:27-30). This enhances the importance of addressing the experiences of the local communities, since this is the context in which the peacebuilding process is taking place.

There is a difference between the formal reality of rebuilding the security institutions and the informal reality in which it is being rebuilt. An approach to statebuilding that follows the notion of a prototypical Western state focuses on the formal security dimension, as the external approach to the SSR in Liberia has illustrated. The problem is, Liberia has never existed as a prototypical Western state. Trying to rebuild something that never existed is problematic, especially when the approach does not comprehend the context in which it is being implemented (Bøås and Jennings 2005:388). In a society where it historically has been impossible to rely on the state as a security guarantor, informal security constellations have been founded (Utas 2008). These are more evident in a hinterland county as Nimba compared to Monrovia. Informal security structures are to a large extent based on social constellations over identity. This enhances the importance of including actors from the local communities in the development of the new security architecture. By alienating local actors from the process of reform, the socio-economic basis of their security is also weakened (Obi 2005:4). There are clear differences between the external security architecture and the local perspectives on it. This is problematic, since land disputes to an increasing degree are following ethnic and tribal lines, reinforcing identity as a renewed potential conflict dimension. When insecurity, caused by an increasing amount of land disputes between different ethnic- and tribal groups is not addressed, the ties of the identity groups become stronger, as well as the division between the groups (Rothchild 2002:8). The identity dimension was an underlying dimension of the civil war, is still vital in the society today, and directly causing problems in the new security institutions.

SSR in a context like the Liberian needs to address both the formal and the informal security structures. By focusing only on the formal side of it, the SSR is not reflecting the context in which it is being implemented. As mentioned in chapter three, the focus of the SSR has been on the LNP, the AFL and the SSS, while there are several other security institutions that have not been reformed. Not much has changed in the LNP, and the security challenges as they are experienced in the local communities,

are directly reflected in the LNP and the AFL. This suggests that if the additional security institutions had been reformed, no real change would be seen in these institutions either, at least not at current time. The real problems lie in the communities, not in the security institutions themselves. It is therefore vital to address the question of local ownership and make sure that the local perspective on security, and local security configurations are also addressed. It is within the Liberian reality that the SSR is supposed to function, and it is the Liberians who are to govern the sector when the international actors withdraw. The alienation the local actors are experiencing, and the lack of focus on the local perspective is already undermining the SSR as a peacebuilding activity in Liberia.

6.4 Summary

The SSR has been approached as an isolated program, thus lacking the holistic approach needed for the SSR to succeed as a peacebuilding activity. The security challenges in the local communities are negatively affecting the efforts of the SSR. Most profound is the identity dimension. The focus of the SSR has been on constructing legitimate forces, but as it has been discussed in this and in the earlier chapters of analysis, the SSR has not achieved this goal since it is not here the main problem lies. The main problems go upwards to the leadership of the security institutions, and it goes downwards to the local communities in which recruitment takes place. What are missing are a focus on the local context and the local perspective on security. There is a lack of focus on the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship, in which the political community is developing (Chandler 2008:23-24). However, it is within this local context that the peace is supposed to prevail. The lack of focus on the local communities is intensifying the intrusiveness caused by the international engagement, and undermining the SSR as a peacebuilding activity.

7.0 Summing up and final remarks

In accordance with the definition of peacebuilding, utilised in this thesis, the root causes of the conflict should be addressed; the security of individuals, social groups and the state should be promoted, and the features that would create conditions for a stable peace should be nurtured (Barnett and Zuercher 2008:9). However, as demonstrated, the root causes of the conflict has not been addressed; there remains a profound experience of insecurity in the local communities, and the peace is seen as depending on the presence of external actors. This study has, in opposition to previous research conducted by Ebo (2005, 2007), Jaye (2006), Loden (2007) and the ICG (2009), not primarily focused on the technical benchmarks and the lack of participation by the legislature and civil society. Instead the focus has been on the local context and reality in which the peacebuilding operation is taking place, and on how the question of ownership is experienced in this context.

The study has followed an interpretive constructionist approach, acknowledging that reality exist both as ideas and experiences, as much as it exists as material and social reality (Rubin and Rubin 2002:27-30). The empirical grounded approach followed is a consequence of this understanding of reality. It was necessary to conduct a field study in the local context to acquire empirical knowledge on how the security situation is experienced in the local context, and whether the lack of local ownership in the SSR really is undermining the reform as a peacebuilding activity. Two supplementary questions were employed to operationalise the research question. Firstly, to what degree the external approach to the SSR is in line with the security situation as it is experienced in the communities. Secondly, whether the external governance of the SSR is alienating the local actors in the process of reform.

7.1 A depoliticised approach, an experience of alienation

As illustrated in chapter four, the external approach to the SSR is a depoliticised one. The reform was supposed to be a partnership of governance, yet it has become a highly uneven partnership. It is uneven both between the external actors and the government, and between the local actors themselves. This depoliticised approach is not facilitating peace. It is undermining the democracy that is being promoted, making it resemble a 'choiceless' democracy (Mkandawire 1999:123). This is contradictory to the policy of SSR, and further contradicts with the democratic path the country is following. In addition, it is increasing the level of intrusiveness caused by the peacebuilding operation, prolonging the dependency on external assistance. This has implications for the prospect of self-governance. The lack of a political agenda in the SSR also affects how the institutional agenda has been lacking (Channa 2002:28-30). The institutional agenda should have ensured that the capacity of the local actors was built. By excluding local actors, such an agenda has become difficult to achieve, which in turn is worsening the prospects of self-governance (Chandler 2006:43, Paris and Sisk 2007:4). The technical approach that is being followed, has affected how the approach to capacity building is being carried out in the same manner. By not promoting local capacity, the dependency on the external actors is further increasing.

There is a clear lack of local ownership in the SSR. However, the question of enhancing local ownership is not straightforward in Liberia. There is a shortage of capacity at all levels of society, and the government and civil society have not assumed the degree of ownership they could have. This could have been different if the approach actually was a partnership and followed the principles of democratic governance, thereby increasing the capacity of local actors to get involved. It is a paradox that the international community expects local actors to govern by the principles of democratic governance, when the external actors themselves are not obligated to. Due to the lack of transparency, accountability and participation by local

actors, the SSR is alienating local actors in the implementation phase. Yet, as it was discussed in chapter four and six, it was the government who were blamed for the lack of progress in the SSR. It was seen as running the country in an exclusively manner. This is connected to the lack of transparency in the statebuilding process, and has led to the governance structure of the SSR becoming unclear, hence making it difficult to distinguish between the internal and the external sphere of governance (Chandler 2006:9, 91). What was supposed to be a partnership of governance has become a tacit partnership. This is highly problematic due to the history of state exclusion, and the polarised nature of Liberian society.

7.2 Security challenges

The experience of alienation is not only connected to the local actors lack of involvement in the reform, but also caused by the lack of a people-centred approach. The reform has focused on reconstructing the institutions of the LNP and the AFL, but as shown in chapters five and six there are security challenges in the communities at risk of undermining the entire peacebuilding process. This is especially evident in the hinterland, making it a paradox that the UNMIL operation has mainly focused on the capital. In chapter five, a distinction was made between Nimba County as a hinterland county and Monrovia as the capital. The experience of insecurity in Monrovia is caused by an immediate security threat due to the rising crime rates and the lack of trust in the LNP. Meanwhile, the insecurity experienced in Nimba County was of a more profound nature. It was described as laying a new prerequisite for conflict, since ethnic and tribal tensions are being refuelled by the increasing number of land disputes taking place. It is an identity dimension concerned with who has the original claim to the land.

The cleavage over identity is widening, since the dimensions today are more interlinked than they were prior to the war. As the reports from the ICG (2009:8) and

the UNSC (2008:3) showed, Nimba is not the only county where this is happening. In Nimba County, the insecurity is further increased due to the situation in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, and also because of the huge amount of not re-integrated ex-rebels just waiting for an opportunity to re-arm. The experience of insecurity is increasing continuously as the full withdrawal of UNMIL is getting closer. The external approach to the SSR is not in line with the security situation, having focused not on the local communities, but rather exclusively on the state institutions. This is indirectly undermining the SSR as a peace-building activity, and is at risk of undermining the SSR directly, as it already has to some extent.

7.3 No real change

No real change seems to have taken place in the new LNP, and the results of the reform of the AFL are yet to be seen. The SSR has focused on rebuilding legitimate forces by reconstituting the AFL, and vetting and reconstructing the LNP. However, legitimate forces cannot be achieved by exclusively focusing on these institutions. The problems go upward to the leadership, and downwards to the communities from where the recruits are drawn. There are severe security challenges in the communities, and the leadership of the institutions are described as the main problem. The reform lacks a holistic perspective. As it was shown in chapters five and six, this is needed since the same identity dimension - apparent in the local communities - are also causing problems in both the LNP and the AFL. Civilians, especially in the hinterland, are still experiencing police officers discriminating between ethnic groups, and ethnic tensions have surfaced between recruits in the new army.

In accordance with the two imperatives of local ownership, local ownership could have enhanced the correspondence between the SSR and the local needs and dynamics (Nathan 2007:7). It could have diminished the gap between the external approach to the SSR and the civilian experience of security. Furthermore, it would

also enhance the chances of consolidating peace and democracy (Nathan 2007:7). The lack of local ownership is contradictory to the aim of fostering self-governance. It has made the governance structure unclear (Chandler 2006:32, Paris and Sisk 2007:4). It is fostering an experience of exclusion, which is already well known in Liberia. This heightens the importance of addressing the question of local ownership and thereby conducting reforms inclusive of different social groups rather than exclusive. Excluding local actors in the process of reform is a way of avoiding having to deal with the root causes of the Liberian civil war. Instead of addressing the history of state exclusion, it is rather facilitating the continuation of it. The peace has become a peace of external governance, enhancing the dependency on external actors (Richmond 2004:92).

7.4 The specific context needs to be addressed

This study has shown the importance of acknowledging, and addressing the specific context in which a peacebuilding operation is taking place. Plans have been made for Liberia without considering the situation on the ground (Bøås 2009a). It resembles a standard international approach, which most likely does not coincide with other post-conflict contexts either. Empirical grounded research is important since it enables an understanding of the specific context in which a mission is taking place. In Liberia, prominent researchers (Bøås 2001 and 2005, Ellis 1999, Huband 1998 and Utas 2003) had conducted empirical grounded research before the international community made plans for Liberia. Yet, the international community followed an approach, where the dimensions of the war were not addressed. As it has been shown, this was a wrong choice since the same dimensions of the war still are present in the contemporary situation. The top-down approach has not acknowledged the problems on the ground. By following the same approach in other post-conflict contexts the root causes of these conflicts will most likely not be addressed either. What is needed is more empirical grounded research on conflict and post-conflict societies. Furthermore, the international community needs to address these findings when

making plans for a post-conflict society. As illustrated through this case study of the SSR in Liberia, success measured in technical terms is not success when the political reality is not addressed. As argued in chapter one, one size does not fit all.

7.5 A technical approach is not sufficient

The theoretical debate on statebuilding has primarily focused on interventions of a more intrusive nature. Yet, this debate has been an important tool for this study. It substantiates the argument made in chapter one that the intrusiveness of the international engagement in Liberia is quite high, even though the mission was supposed to follow a light footprint model. The same characteristics that Chandler (2006, 2008), Narten (2008), Paris and Sisk (2007) and Richmond (2004) describe as taking place in external statebuilding operations, are also taking place in Liberia. The distinction between the political sphere of internal and external governance has become unclear, enabling external actors to distance themselves from the political aspects of reform (Chandler 2006:40, 2008:15). The consequence is statebuilding operations that follow technical rather than political measures. A technical approach is easier to accomplish since the external actors are neither subject to the requirements of democratic governance in their approaches, nor responsible for the political outcomes of them. The democratic aspects have become subordinated the external governance of reform, thus neglecting the responsibility that follows with intervention, and making the democracy that is being promoted resemble a ‘choiceless’ democracy (Chandler 2006:22, Mkandawire 1999:123).

The policy of statebuilding resembles a long-term enterprise. However, the efficiency aspect, due to limited available resources, raises tensions between the means and the aims in the practice of policy implementation (Paris and Sisk 2007:5-6). There is, as the UN (2002, 2005:71) outline, a lack of willingness, consensus and resources from the member states in UN-led operations. This affects how policies evolve into terms

that are easier to operationalise (Bøås and McNeill 2005:212), thus compromising the long-term objectives of peacebuilding operations, and making the governance structure unclear for those not included in it (Paris and Sisk 2007:4-7). Even though local actors would not necessarily develop good practices, there are clear indications, as illustrated in this case study of the SSR in Liberia, that the lack of local ownership is undermining current efforts of reform. As stated in chapter one, local actors need to be empowered to be able to yield good results in the long-term (Nathan 2007:7-8). What is missing is, as Chandler (2008:23-24) argues, a focus on the political sphere of sovereignty and citizenship in which the political community is developing.

References

Adcock, Robert and David Collier (2001): 'Measurement Validity: A Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research'. *American Political Science Review*. 95 (3), pp. 529-546.

Andersen, Svein S. (1997): *Case-studier og generalisering, Forskningsstrategi og Design*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS.

Avant, Deborah (2008): *Opportunistic Peacebuilders? International Organizations, Private Military Training and State-building after War*. Discussion draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building. Available at: <http://state-building.org> Downloaded the 25th of March 2008.

Barash, David P. and Charles P. Webel (2002): *Peace and Conflict Studies*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Barnett, Michael and Christoph Zuercher (2008): *The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood*. Discussion draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building. Available at: <http://state-building.org> Downloaded the 25th of March.

Berdal, Mats and David M. Malone (2000): *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War*, (eds.). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Boutros, Boutros-Ghali (1992): An Agenda for Peace. Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. UN document, report by the Secretary-General. Available at: <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html> Downloaded the 4th of February 2009.

Brýden, Alan and Heiner Hänggi (2004): *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*. Münster: LIT Verlag.

Bøås, Morten (2009a): 'Making Plans for Liberia' (forthcoming).

Bøås, Morten (2009b): 'Militia formation and the nationalisation of local conflict in Liberia', in Klejda Mulaj (ed.), *Violent Non-State Actors in Contemporary World Politics*. London: Hurst (forthcoming).

Bøås, Morten (2009c): 'Funérailles pour un ami: la citoyenneté contestée dans la guerre civile libérienne'. *Politique Africaine* (forthcoming).

Bøås, Morten (2009d): 'Liberia – a democracy reborn?' in Waly Ndiaye (ed.), *Evaluating Electoral Processes and the State Democracy in Western Africa*. Dakar: Goree Institute (forthcoming).

Bøås, Morten (2008): *Violence as Empowerment: Youth Agency in West African Conflicts*. Presentation at the seminar 'Youth and African Conflict – agency, empowerment and victims'. Organised by Africa Network Norway and Fafo. Hosted by Fafo, Oslo. The 2nd of December 2008.

Bøås, Morten (2005): 'The Liberian Civil War: New War/Old War'. *Global Society*, 19 (1), pp. 73-88.

Bøås, Morten (2001): 'Liberia and Sierra Leone – dead Ringers? The logic of Neopatrimonial Rule'. *Third World Quarterly*, 22 (5), pp. 697-723.

Bøås, Morten and Karin Dokken (2002): *Internasjonal Politikk og Utenrikspolitikk i Afrika Sør for Sahara*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Bøås, Morten and Anne Hatløy (2008): 'Getting in, getting out: militia membership and prospects for re-integration in post-war Liberia'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 46 (1), pp. 33-55.

Bøås, Morten and Kathleen M. Jennings (2005): 'Insecurity and Development. The Rhetoric of the "Failed State" '. *European Journal of Development Research* 17 (3), pp. 385-395.

Bøås, Morten and Desmond McNeill (2005): 'Ideas and institutions: who is framing what?' in Morten Bøås and Desmond McNeill (eds.), *Global Institutions & Development, Framing the World?* London: Routledge, pp. 206-223.

Caplan, Richard (2005): *International Governance of War-Torn Territories*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chanaa, Jane (2002): 'Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects'. *Adelphi Paper* 344. The International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Chandler, David (2008): 'Post-Territorial Politics: The Strange Death of Liberal IR and the Biopolitical Critique'. *Paper*, presented at the British International Studies Association's Annual Conference, Exeter, December.

Chandler, David (2006): *Empire in Denial. The Politics of Statebuilding*. London: Pluto Press.

Chandler, David (2002): *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention*. London: Pluto Press.

Chesterman, Simon (2007): 'Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1 (1), pp. 2-23.

Chesterman, Simon (2004): *You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chesterman, Simon (2002): *Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building*. New York: International Peace Academy Report.

Clapham, Christopher (1978): 'Liberia', in John Dunn (ed.), *West African States: failure and promise*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 117-131.

Collier, Paul (2000): *Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy*. Washington DC: World Bank.

CPA (2003), the 18th of August. Available at:
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html
 Downloaded the 7th of August 2008.

Doornbos, Martin (2003): 'State Collapse and Fresh Starts: Some Critical Reflection', in Jennifer Milliken (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 25-62.

Ebo, Adedeji (2007): 'Liberia Case Study: Outsourcing SSR to Foreign Companies', in Laurie Nathan (ed.), *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors*. Commissioned by the Security Sector Reform Strategy of the UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool. Available at:
<http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/SSRReformNathan2007.pdf>
 Downloaded the 28th of January 2008, pp. 84-92.

Ebo, Adedeji (2005): 'The Challenges and Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia'. *Occasional Paper*, 9. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp. i-v, 1-28

Ellis, Stephen (1999): *The Mask of Anarchy*. London: Hurst & Company.

Forman, Shepard, Patrick Stewart, and Dirk Salomons (2000): *Recovering from Conflict: Strategy for an International Response*. New York: Center on International Cooperation.

Foucault, Michael (1991): 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect, Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 87-104.

Galtung, Johan (1969): 'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, pp. 167-191.

Hanlon, Joseph (2006): 'Roots of Civil War: tick all of the above', in Joseph Hanlon and Helen Yanacopoulos (eds.), *Civil War, Civil Peace*. Milton Keynes: The Open University, pp. 72-94.

Hansen, Annika S. (2005): 'Building Local Capacity for Maintaining Public Security', in Anja H. Ebnöter and Philip H. Fluri (eds.), *After Intervention: Public Security Management in Post-conflict Societies – From Intervention to Sustainable Ownership*. Vienna: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence; National Defence Academy, pp. 293-331.

Hansen, Annika S. and Sharon Wiharta (2006): 'The Transition to Order After Conflict'. *SIPRI Policy Report* (draft).

Hartzell, Caroline, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild (2001): 'Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables'. *International Organisation* 55 (1), pp. 183-208.

Hellevik, Ottar (1991): *Forskningsmetode i Sociologi og Statsvitenskap*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Hoyle, Rick H., Charles M. Judd and Monica J. Harris (2002): *Research Methods in Social Relations*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Huband, Mark (1998): *The Liberian Civil War*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

ICG (2009): *Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform*. Africa Report, 148, pp. 1-40. Available at:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/west_africa/148_liberia_uneven_progress_in_security_sector_reform.pdf

Downloaded the 14th of January 2009.

ICISS (2001): *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. Available at: <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf> Downloaded on the 15th of September 2008.

Ignatieff, Michael (2003): *Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. London: Vintage Publisher.

Jaye, Thomas (2006): *An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform*. The Governance Commission of Liberia, the 23rd of September. Available at: http://www.kaipctc.org/_upload/general/Lib_Assess_Rep_on_SSR.pdf Downloaded the 7th of August 2008.

Jennings, Kathleen (2007): *The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-combatants in Liberia*. *International Peacekeeping*, 14 (2), pp. 204-218.

Kaldor, Mary (2001a): *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Kaldor, Mary (2001b): *Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control*. Essay for the Nobel Peace Prize Centennial Symposium, the 6-8th of December. Available at: <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kaldor.htm> Downloaded the 11th of December 2008.

Kjelstadli, Knut (1992): *Fortida er ikke hva den en gang var. En innføring i historiefaget*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Klare, Michael T. (2001): *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. New York: Henry Holt.

Krasner, Stephen (2004): 'Shared Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsing and Failing States'. *International Security*, 29 (2), pp. 5-43.

Kvale, Steiner (2006): *Det Kvalitative forskningsintervju*. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS.

Leander, Anna (2005): 'The Market for Force and Public Security. The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 42 (5), pp. 605-622.

Levitt, Jeremy I. (2005): *The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia*. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

Licklider, Roy (1993): 'How Civil Wars End: Questions and Methods', in Roy Licklider (ed.), *Stopping the Killing, How Civil Wars End*, (ed.). New York: New York University Press, pp. 3-19.

Loden, Alexander (2007) 'Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train without Brushes'. *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, Vol. 1, pp. 297-307.

Lundin, Iraê Baptista (1996): 'Cultural Diversity and the Role of Transitional Authority in Mozambique', in Donald Rothchild (ed.), *Strengthening African Local Initiative: Local Self-Governance, Decentralization and Accountability*. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, pp. 83-94.

Marshall, Catherine and Gretchen B. Rossman (1995): *Designing Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Mikkelsen, Britha (1995): *Methods for Development Work and Research. A Guide for Practitioners*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Mkandawire, Thandika (1999): 'Crisis Management and the Making of Choiceless Democracies', in Richard Joseph (ed.), *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 119-136.

Narten, Jens (2008): *Dilemmas of Promoting Local Ownership, Statebuilding in Postwar Kosovo*. Discussion draft for Research Partnership on Postwar State-Building. Downloaded the 25 of March 2008. Available at: <http://state-building.org>
Downloaded the 25th of March 2008.

Nathan, Laurie, ed. (2007): *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors*. Commissioned by the Security Sector Reform Strategy of the UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool.

NESH, Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora (2006): *Forskningsetiske Retningslinjer for Samfunnsvitenskap, Humaniora, Juss og Teologi*. Available at:
<http://www.etikkom.no/retningslinjer/NESHretningslinjer/NESHretningslinjer/06>
Downloaded the 23rd of October 2008.

Obi, Cyril (2005): 'Conflict and Peace in West Africa'. *News from the Nordic Africa Institute*, 1, pp. 2-5. Available at:
http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/documents/news1_2005.pdf
Downloaded the 1st of December 2008.

Ottaway, Marina (2003): 'Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States', in Jennifer Milliken (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse & Reconstruction*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 245-266.

Paris, Roland (2004): *At War's End, Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk (2007): *Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding*. Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding. International Peace Academy, November. Available at: <http://state-building.org>
Downloaded the 25th of March 2008.

Patton, Michael Q. (1990): *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.

Ragin, Charles C. and Gisele de Meur (2000): 'Political Methodology: Qualitative Methods', in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 749-768.

Rees, Edward (2006): *External Study, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: "Improvisation and Confusion" from the field*. Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Available at: http://doc.operationspaix.net/serv1/MINUK_best_practices_Rees_2006-03_.pdf Downloaded the 6th of December 2008.

Richmond, Oliver P. (2004): 'UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus'. *International Peacekeeping*, 11 (1), pp. 83-101.

Rothchild, Donald (2002): 'Durable peace after civil war: The structuring of ethnic interaction'. *University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, Politics and Economic Series*, 60, pp. 1-36.

Rubin, Herbert J. and Irene S. Rubin (2005): *Qualitative Interviewing, The Art of Hearing Data*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc.

Sawyer, Amos (2005): *Beyond Plunder, Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia*. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

Sedra, Mark (2004): 'Security Sector Transformation in Afghanistan'. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. *Working Paper*, no. 143. Available at: http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/WP143.pdf Downloaded the 6th of December 2008.

Thagaard, Tove (2006): *Systematikk og Innlevelse*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS.

UN (2007): 'Linkage between the DDR and the SSR'. *Issue Paper*, pp. 3-26. Kinshasa: Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa. The 13th and 14th of June. A cooperation between the UN's Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Available at: <http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/ddr-ssr.pdf>
Downloaded the 27th of March 2008.

UN (2005): *World Summit Outcome*. The General Assembly. The 8th plenary meeting, the 16th of September. Available at: <http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf>
Downloaded the 15th of September 2008.

UN (2004): *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility*. UN's Secretary Generals high-level panel on threats, challenges and change. Available at: <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf> Downloaded the 15 of September 2008.

UN (2000): *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. "The Brahimi Report", S/2000/809. New York: United Nations. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/
Downloaded the 29th of September 2008.

UNMIL (2008): *At Work Together*. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia. Available at: http://unmil.org/documents/atworktogether_uninliberia.pdf
Downloaded the 9th of December 2008.

UNSC (2008): *Seventeenth Progress Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2008/533. New York: United Nations. Available at: <http://unmil.org/documents/sgreports/sg17pr.pdf>
Downloaded the 13th of November 2008.

Utas, Mats (2008): *Informal Security Structure in Mano River Region: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Outline of a project co-organized with Magnus Jörgel. Available at: <http://www.nai.uu.se/research/areas/informal/index.xml?query=Informal+Security+Structure+in+the+Mano+River+Region&search=Search&db=publications>
Downloaded the 9th of December 2008.

Utas, Mats (2003): *Sweet Battlefields, Youth and the Liberian Civil War*. Stockholm: Lindholm & Co.

Walton, John (1992): 'Making the Theoretical Case', in Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker (eds.), *What Is A Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.121-138.

Weiss, Thomas G. and Peter J. Hoffman (2007): 'The Fog of Humanitarianism: Collective Action Problems and Learning-Challenged Organizations'. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1 (1), pp. 47-65.

Yin, Robert K. (2003): *Case Study Research, Design and Methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Appendix, an overview of interviews

UNPOL:

Dag Dahlen

Training and Development Coordinator at the police academy.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 8th of May 2008.

Henrik Stiernblad.

Leader of UNPOL in Liberia.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 21st of May 2008.

DynCorp:

Representatives from DynCorp.

Gbarnga the 12-13th of May 2008 and the military training camp outside Monrovia the 21st of May 2008.

The LNP:

Cletus N. Togba

Research and planning officer in Monrovia.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 8th of May 2008.

Gboulou C. Koulou IV.

Commissioner for the police of administration and professional standard in the LNP in Monrovia. Joined the LNP in 1996. Went to the US in 1997, where he got a master degree in social science, started on a Phd, but came back to Liberia when the war ended. Interviewed in Monrovia, the 7th of May 2008.

Francois R. Junior

Serves as a manager for forensic police department for the political commission.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 8th of May 2008.

Joseph B. Quinakertor
Deputy Police Commander for Ganta.
Interviewed in Ganta, the 14th of May 2008.

Lee Gilah
Personal division officer in Monrovia.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 7th of May 2008

Nelson Freeman
General Commander for Bong County.
Interviewed in Gbarnga, the 12th of May 2008.

William K. Mullbah
Deputy Commissioner for training and development at the police academy.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 3rd of May 2008.

The government:

The Vice President of Liberia, Joseph Boakei
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 22nd of May 2008.

Representative from the defence ministry.
Interviewed in Gbarnga the 13th of May 2008.

Media:

Nyahn Flomo
Works with the Norwegian Refugee Council and Radio Kergheamahn in Ganta.
Interviewed in Ganta, the 26th of May 2008.

Peter M. Quaqua
Secretary-General of the Press Union of Liberia.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 29th of May 2008.

Wellington G. Smith
Editor in chief, Star Radio.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 30th of May 2008.

Civil Society- and community actors:

Aaron Deayi
Director for 'Ears for the Masses' in Saniquillie.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 27th of May 2008.

Aaron B. Weah
Works with the International Centre for Transitional Justice. Former member of the SSR working group.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 30th of May 2008.

Abraham Mitchell
Program analyst and consultant of the SSR program of the Governance Commission.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008.

Alfred Quayjandii
National coordinator of the National Human Rights Centre of Liberia.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 2nd of May 2008.

Amos Yini
Works in a youth organisation to re-integrate former combatants in Ganta. Former member of the property- and land commission in Ganta. Officer in the AFL until 2003 when he joined GoL as a commander.
Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008.

Caroline Bowah

Coordinator for the SSR working group in Liberia.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 20th of May 2008.

Cecil Griffiths

President of Liberia National Law Enforcement Association and member of the SSR working group. Officer in the LNP during the war.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 6th of May 2008.

Dawanah Kingsley

Works at the National Human rights centre in Monrovia.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 2nd of May 2008.

Dohr Cooper

Works with the re-integration of former combatants in Ganta. Former commander in the NPFL. Interviewed in Ganta, the 26th of May 2008.

Emmanuel Mayanga

Evangelist in the Church of Christ in Ganta.

Interviewed in Ganta, the 26th of May 2008.

Ernest Hamburg

Works with the re-integration of ex-rebels in Ganta.

Interviewed in Monrovia, the 28th of May 2008.

Musoui

Chief for one of the largest Mandingo tribes in Ganta.

Interviewed by Jairo Munive at a market area in Guinea, 15-20 km from the Ganta border, the 15th of May 2008.

Patrick Bamakpa

Member of the local peace consul in Saniquillie.

Interviewed in Saniquillie, the 24th of May 2008.

Zawolo Z. Zuagele

Former representative of the legislation, for Alliance for Peace and Democracy, under the rule of the interim government, 2003-2005. Works today with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Interviewed in Ganta, the 14th of May 2008.